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REACH OUT AND TOUCH SOMEONE: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY 
OF FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. V. RURAL 
TELEPHONE SERVICE CO. 
**Craig Joyce & Tyler T. Ochoa*** 
ABSTRACT 
 
2016 marks the 25th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 
one of the Court’s landmark opinions in copyright law, and one 
that continues to define the standard of originality for 
copyrighted works in general and compilations of data in 
particular. The Feist case, however, was an unlikely candidate 
for landmark status. Only a handful of court opinions and 
academic authors had expressed dissatisfaction with the existing 
state of the law concerning originality and data compilations. 
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Further, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Feist was a two-page, 
unpublished decision that could not be cited as precedent. The 
Supreme Court nonetheless granted certiorari and resolved a 
circuit split by rejecting decisively the “sweat of the brow” 
doctrine. In doing so, and in unexpectedly grounding its opinion 
in the Constitution’s Copyright Clause, the Court firmly 
reinvigorated a standard for originality that has proven durable, 
flexible, and occasionally controversial in meeting the challenges 
of copyright law in the 21st century. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
2016 marks the 25th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service 
Co.,1 one of the Court’s landmark opinions in copyright law—and 
one that continues to define the standard of originality for 
copyrighted works in general and compilations of data in 
particular. The Feist case, however, was an unlikely candidate 
for landmark status. Only a handful of court opinions and 
academic authors had expressed dissatisfaction with the existing 
state of the law concerning originality and data compilations.2 
Further, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Feist was a two-page, 
unpublished decision that could not be cited as precedent.3 The 
Supreme Court nonetheless decided to “reach out and touch 
someone”4 by granting certiorari,5 and it resolved a circuit split 
by rejecting decisively the “sweat of the brow” doctrine.6 In doing 
so, and in unexpectedly grounding its opinion in the 
                                                 
 1. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (argued Jan. 9, 1991; decided Mar. 27, 1991). Hereinafter, 
any mention to Feist, without more, refers to this Supreme Court opinion. 
 2. See infra Part II.D. 
 3. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990) (opinion 
reproduced in full as Appendix 3), rev’d, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Indeed, in a September 11, 
1990 letter to his fellow Justices, John Paul Stevens recommended that the Court grant 
certiorari in another telephone directory case, Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Haines & Co., 
905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), and not in Feist: “CA7’s opinion . . . is published, unlike 
CA10’s opinion in Feist Publications. Moreover, CA10’s opinion does not explicitly resolve 
this issue [i.e., the degree of copyright protection properly afforded under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 103(b) to telephone directories and other compilations of facts] but affirms the district 
court’s resolution.” Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 
(Sept. 11, 1990) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers, Box 573, Folder 89-1909) (visited Oct. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Blackmun 
Papers]. Ultimately, Justice O’Connor and the Court took a quite different tack toward 
the issues presented in Illinois Bell and Feist—and utilized the latter as their vehicle for 
decision. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice O’Connor (Mar. 25, 1991) in 
Blackmun Papers. 
 4. In 1979, American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) urged people 
across the country to—metaphorically—“Reach Out and Touch Someone” through AT&T’s 
telephone service. See Bell System “Reach Out and Touch Someone” Commercial (Apr. 2, 
1979), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HO17B-ACRn0 [https://perma.cc/XYE7-RHTE]. 
The slogan and ad campaign proved to be highly popular, even spawning a 2001 episode 
of the television courtroom comedy series Ally McBeal. Ally McBeal: Reach Out and Touch 
(20th Century Fox television broadcast Feb. 12, 2001), http://www.imdb.com 
/title/tt0510336/ [https://perma.cc/X6RC-P4P5]. In 1984, reduced in scope after fighting 
federal antitrust litigation and now only formerly known as “Ma Bell,” AT&T faced a new 
competitive marketplace accompanied by new advertising imperatives. A sharper-edged 
campaign, “The Right Choice,” rolled out at the end of 1985. See The Right Choice, AT&T 
TECH CHANNEL (July 25, 2012), http://techchannel.att.com/play-video.cfm/2012/7/25/at&t-
archives-the-right-choice [https://perma.cc/JB2V-5VQ6]. 
 5. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 498 U.S. 808 (1990). 
 6. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352–54. See infra Part III.B. 
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Constitution’s Copyright Clause, the Court firmly reinvigorated a 
standard for originality that has proven durable, flexible, and 
occasionally controversial in meeting the challenges of copyright 
law in the 21st century; and it also provided meaningful, if 
incomplete, guidance as to what aspects of compilation works are 
copyrightable under current U.S. law. 
Part II of this essay surveys the law of originality before 
Feist, from the 19th-century cases on which Feist primarily 
relied, to the early 20th-century cases setting forth the doctrine 
then known as “industrious collection,” to the late 20th-century 
cases that began to question the doctrine. Part III tells the story 
of the Feist case itself and analyzes the opinion. Part IV looks at 
the aftermath of the case and briefly discusses its influence on 
U.S. copyright law. Part V concludes. 
II. BEFORE FEIST 
A. Originality in the 19th Century 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
provides: 
The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.7 
The grammatical structure of the Clause suggests that 
copyrights are granted to authors for their writings, to promote 
the progress of “science” (meaning “knowledge” generally, in 
18th-century parlance),8 while patents are granted to inventors 
for their discoveries, to promote the progress of the “useful Arts”9 
                                                 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For historical background concerning this clause, 
see generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 675 (2002). 
 8. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785) 
(defining “science” as “knowledge” or “any art of species of knowledge”); NOAH WEBSTER, 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828) (defining “science” as, 
“[i]n a general sense, knowledge, or certain knowledge”). 
 9. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 11–12, 115–33 (2002); Sean O’Connor, The 
Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 
809–26 (2015); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 192–93 (2003); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). But see Dotan 
Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L. REV. 421,  
463–69 (2009) (contending that the phrase “Science and useful Arts” should not be read 
disjunctively). 
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(meaning “technology,” as distinguished from the liberal arts).10 
“Progress” had two meanings in the 18th century: it meant both 
an improvement in quality, as it does today, and also 
“dissemination” or “spread.”11 Thus, patents are granted to 
promote the creation and dissemination of technology, in the 
form of new inventions, while copyrights are granted to promote 
the creation and dissemination of knowledge, in the form of new 
works of authorship. 
The Copyright Act of 1790 potentially granted copyright 
protection, subject to conditions, to “any map, chart, book or 
books.”12 An 1802 amendment added any “print or prints” made 
by engraving or etching,13 while the Copyright Act of 1831 added 
any “musical composition” to the list.14 These acts did not 
expressly set forth any minimum standard which a work had to 
meet in order to qualify for copyright protection; however, all of 
them used the word “author” in identifying the person entitled to 
copyright protection. The word “author” implies some degree of 
originality, because “the writer cannot have been the author of 
what he has borrowed from another.”15 Hence, the question 
became what degree of “authorship” was necessary to qualify for 
copyright protection. 
As early as 1821, Justice Bushrod Washington, riding 
circuit, expressed the view that copyright must be limited to 
matters which were original to the plaintiff, and that if the 
elements comprising the work were not original, a copyright 
                                                 
 10. 1 JOHNSON, supra note 8 (defining “art” as “[t]he power of doing something not 
taught by nature and instinct,” and distinguishing “the liberal arts” from “a trade,” such 
as “the art of making sugar”); WEBSTER, supra note 8 (defining “art” as “[t]he disposition 
or modification of things by human skill” and distinguishing the “useful or mechanic” 
arts, “those in which the hands and body are more concerned,” from the “liberal or polite” 
arts, “those in which the mind or imagination is chiefly concerned; as poetry, music and 
painting”); see also Sean O’Connor, The Lost “Art” of the Patent System, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1397, 1447–54 (documenting the changing meaning of “art”). 
 11. Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining “Progress” in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress 
Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 794–809 (2001); see also 2 JOHNSON, supra note 8 (defining 
“progress” as “[c]ourse; procession” and “[a]dvancement; motion forward,” or “[i]ntellectual 
improvement; advancement in knowledge”); WEBSTER, supra note 8 (defining “progress” 
as “[a] moving or going forward; a proceeding onward” and “[a] moving forward in growth; 
increase” or “[a]dvance in knowledge; intellectual or moral improvement”). 
 12. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. 
 13. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171. 
 14. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. 
 15. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 169 (1847). 
Chapter V of Curtis’s treatise is titled “Of the Originality Necessary for a Valid 
Copyright.” Id.; see also WEBSTER, supra note 8 (defining “author” as “[o]ne who produces, 
creates, or brings into being”). 
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could only exist in an original selection or arrangement of them. 
He thus declined copyright protection to an engraving consisting 
in part of the coats of arms of the states, signatures copied from 
the Declaration of Independence, and three portraits copied from 
existing paintings: 
It is then quite obvious, that neither the design . . . nor the 
parts which composed it, were the invention of the plaintiff. 
The former, which constitutes the combination, or 
arrangement of the parts, owed its conception and 
delineation to Mr. Bridport . . . The portraits, arms of the 
United States, and of the several states, were, long before 
the year 1816, printed or drawn, and were copied by the 
artists employed by the plaintiff, as were also the original 
signatures to the declaration.16 
Similarly, in Clayton v. Stone, Justice Smith Thompson, 
riding circuit, declined to extend copyright protection to “the 
daily price-current or review of the market, compiled by 
plaintiffs,”17 despite the effort the plaintiff expended in compiling 
the facts: 
[T]he object [of the Copyright Act] was the promotion of 
science; and it would certainly be a pretty extraordinary 
view of the sciences to consider a daily or weekly 
publication of the state of the market as falling within any 
class of them. . . . Although great praise may be due to the 
plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in publishing 
this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being 
rewarded in this way.18 
In Emerson v. Davies, Justice Joseph Story, riding circuit, 
explained that an original selection and arrangement of 
materials could be protected by copyright, even if the materials 
themselves were copied from other sources and were therefore 
not original: 
The question is not, whether the materials which [the 
plaintiff] used are entirely new, and have never been used 
                                                 
 16. Binns v. Woodruff, 3 F. Cas. 421, 424 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 1,424); see also 
Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 517 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323) (“a prior compiler is 
not permitted to monopolize what was not original in himself, and what must be nearly 
identical in all such works on a like subject”); Gould v. Hastings, 10 F. Cas. 877, 877 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No. 5,639) (Thompson, J.) (“the question [is] whether these law 
reports are subjects of copyright; and, if they may be so to any extent, what parts are to be 
regarded original matter entitled to be so protected”) (emphasis added). 
 17. 5 F. Cas. 999, 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872). 
 18. Id. at 1003. The U.S. Supreme Court later quoted this passage with approval in 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880), and in Feist, 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991). See infra 
note 28. 
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before . . . The true question is, whether the same plan, 
arrangement and combination of materials have been used 
before . . . He may have borrowed much of his materials 
from others, but if they are combined in a different manner 
from what was in use before, . . . he is entitled to a 
copy-right in the book embodying such improvement.19 
At the same time, there developed another line of cases that 
theorized instead that a person was entitled to a copyright solely 
as a result of the expenditure of labor, and that another who 
copied facts from the first “author,” instead of independently 
discovering the facts for himself or herself, was an infringer.20 In 
Blunt v. Patten, for example, the plaintiff had undertaken to 
survey the northeastern coast of the United States and had 
discovered that the south shoal off the coast of Nantucket lay 
some twenty miles north of its previously reported location. The 
plaintiff published a marine chart, on which he secured a 
copyright, that included that information.21 He sought an 
injunction against the publication by the defendant of a marine 
chart that purportedly copied the information from the plaintiff’s 
chart. Justice Thompson, riding circuit, instructed the jury as 
follows: 
[T]he plaintiff could not, it was true, obtain a copyright in 
the shoal itself, nor in the original elements [i.e., natural 
features] of his charts; but . . . he had a right to the results 
of his labors and surveys. The defendant might resort to the 
original materials [i.e., natural features] of the chart, and 
survey for himself; but he could not avail himself, either in 
whole or in part, of the surveys of the plaintiff. The law was 
intended to secure to authors the fruits of their skill, labor 
and genius, for a limited time; and if in this instance the 
defendant had availed himself of the surveys of the plaintiff 
                                                 
 19. 8 F. Cas. 615, 618–19 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436); see also id. at 619 (“In 
truth, every author of a book has a copy-right in the plan, arrangement and combination 
of his materials, . . . if it be new and original in its substance.”). 
 20. See generally Robert Brauneis, The Transformation of Originality in the 
Progressive-Era Debate Over Copyright in News, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321,  
328–32 (2009); Miriam Bitton, Trends in Protection for Informational Works Under 
Copyright Law in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. 
REV. 115, 123–27 (2006); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright 
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1875–79 (1990). 
 21. Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 762, 762 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,579); see also 
Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,580) (opinion in the same case 
denying a preliminary injunction, but issuing a permanent injunction after jury verdict of 
copying). 
Joyce and Ochoa_EIC Edit Complete_McIntosh (Do Not Delete)  11/14/2016  6:17 PM 
108 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [54:2 
in compiling his chart, the plaintiff was entitled to a 
verdict.22 
Likewise, Justice Story, riding circuit, agreed in dicta that a 
plaintiff could obtain a copyright in factual information obtained 
through a survey: 
A man has a right to the copy-right of a map of a state or 
country, which he has surveyed or caused to be compiled 
from existing materials, at his own expense, or skill, or 
labor, or money. Another man may publish another map of 
the same state or country, by using the like means or 
materials, and the like skill, labor and expense. But then he 
has no right to publish a map taken substantially and 
designedly from the map of the other person, without any 
such exercise of skill, or labor, or expense.23 
The tension between these two lines of cases was seemingly 
resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of cases decided 
under the 1870 Act.24 In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court held 
that the trademark portion of the 1870 Act was not authorized by 
the Copyright and Patent Clause, because “neither originality, 
invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way essential to 
the right conferred by that act.”25 The Court explained: 
[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed . . . it 
is only such as are original, and are founded in the creative 
powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected 
                                                 
 22. Blunt, 3 F. Cas. at 762; see also Blunt, 3 F. Cas. at 764 (“[T]he complainant has, 
by devoting his time and expending his money, discovered that error and corrected it in 
his chart, . . . and he ought to be protected in the enjoyment of the profits of his 
enterprise.”); id. at 764–65 (“[T]he natural objects from which the charts are made are 
open to the examination of all, and any one has a right to survey and make a chart. And if 
such surveys and charts are all correct, all will be alike, but no one would complain of his 
rights having been infringed . . . A right, in such a subject, is violated only when another 
copies from the chart of him who has secured the copyright, and thereby availing himself 
of his labor and skill.”). 
 23. Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619; see also Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728) (Story, J.) (“[S]uppose a person has bestowed his time and 
skill and attention, and made a large series of topographical surveys in order to perfect 
such a map . . . It is clear, that notwithstanding this production, he cannot supersede the 
right of any other person to use the same means by similar surveys and labors to 
accomplish the same end. But it is just as clear, that he [i.e., the other person] has no 
right, without any such surveys and labors, to sit down and copy the whole of the map 
already produced by the skill and labors of the first party, and thus to rob him of all the 
fruit of his industry, skill, and expenditures.”). 
 24. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. The 1870 Act covered “any book, map, 
chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative 
thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs 
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts.” § 86, 16 Stat. at 212. 
 25. 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
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are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of 
books, prints, engravings, and the like. The trade-mark 
may be, and generally is, the adoption of something already 
in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party using 
it. . . . [It] does [not] depend upon novelty, invention, 
discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or 
imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.26 
This language clearly indicates that copyright protection 
requires some “fancy or imagination, genius, or laborious 
thought”; and while it can be read to imply that labor can be 
protected,27 the opinion emphasizes that it must be laborious 
thought, and intellectual labor, involving “the creative powers of 
the mind.” Thus, The Trade-Mark Cases imply that copyright 
cannot be conferred as a reward for the noncreative labor of 
recording or discovering facts. 
In Baker v. Selden,28 the Court held that the copyright in a 
book explaining a new system of bookkeeping was limited to the 
author’s expression in explaining the system, and did not extend 
to the system itself, even assuming that the system was copied by 
another: 
[When] the teachings of science and the rules and methods 
of useful art . . . [are] embodied and taught in a literary 
composition or book, their essence consists only in their 
statement. This alone is what is secured by the copyright.29 
In so holding, the Court distinguished between the 
originality required for a copyright and the novelty required for a 
patent: 
The copyright of the book, if not pirated from other works, 
would be valid without regard to the novelty, or want of 
novelty, of its subject-matter. The novelty of the art or thing 
                                                 
 26. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 27. See Brauneis, supra note 20, at 326. 
 28. 101 U.S. 99 (1880). For the historical background and an analysis of the case, 
see Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between 
Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159 (Jane C. Ginsburg & 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). While the Supreme Court in Feist did not rely on 
Baker as a principal authority to the degree that it did The Trade-Mark Cases and 
Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony, it did end its opinion with a flourish by 
quoting from Baker: “[G]reat praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and 
enterprise in publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being 
rewarded in this way.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) 
(quoting Baker, 101 U.S. at 105) (internal quotations omitted). The quote, not original to 
Baker, was drawn from Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 
2,872). See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 29. Baker, 101 U.S. at 104. 
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described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of 
the copyright. To give to the author of the book an exclusive 
property in the art described therein, when no examination 
of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a 
surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province 
of letters-patent, not of copyright. . . . 
The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the 
benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive 
claim to the art itself. . . . The former may be secured by 
copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be 
secured at all, by letters-patent.30 
Although Baker concerned the distinction between 
“Writings” and “useful Arts,” the same reasoning can be applied 
to facts. Indeed, Baker itself states that the same principles apply 
to both facts and methods: “Where the truths of a science or the 
methods of an art are the common property of the whole world, 
any author has the right to express the one, or explain and use 
the other, in his own way.”31 The Court gave no indication that 
the “truths of a science” (i.e., facts) could be protected by 
copyright, even if they were discovered by the “author.” 
Finally, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,32 the 
Court rejected an argument that the Copyright Clause did not 
permit Congress to extend copyright to photographs because “a 
photograph is not a writing nor the production of an author.”33 In 
a key passage, the Court defined the constitutional terms: 
An author . . . is “he to whom anything owes its origin; 
originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or 
literature.” Worcester. . . .[34] By writings in that clause is 
meant the literary productions of those authors, and 
congress very properly has declared these to include all 
forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, [et]c., by 
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible 
expression. . . . 
 We entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad 
enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of 
                                                 
 30. Id. at 102, 105. 
 31. Id. at 100–01. 
 32. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). For the historical background and an analysis of the case, 
see Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the 
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385 (2004). 
 33. 111 U.S. at 56. 
 34. The Court actually misquotes Worcester’s definition, which reads “one who 
composes a work of science or literature” rather than “completes.” JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 99 (1860) (emphasis added). 
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photographs, so far as they are representatives of original 
intellectual conceptions of the author.35 
The Court then turned to the defendant’s argument that the 
production of a photograph “involves no originality of thought or 
any novelty in the intellectual operation connected with its 
visible reproduction.”36 The Court responded by quoting the third 
finding of fact: 
“ . . . plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from his own 
original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by 
posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, 
selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other 
various accessories in said photograph, arranging the 
subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and 
disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the 
desired expression, and from such disposition, 
arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, 
he produced the picture in suit.” These findings, we think, 
show this photograph to be an original work of art, the 
product of plaintiff’s intellectual invention, of which 
plaintiff is the author.37 
As a result of Burrow-Giles, the standard of copyright was 
firmly established. To qualify for copyright, a work had to be an 
“original intellectual conception,” or “the product of [one’s] 
intellectual invention.” Merely recording facts, without adding 
any original thought, was not a sufficient basis for copyright 
protection. 
In a coda to this line of cases, the Court held in Higgins v. 
Keuffel that copyright did not extend to the printed labels 
attached to bottles of ink: 
The clause of the Constitution under which Congress is 
authorized to legislate for the protection of authors and 
inventors . . . evidently has reference only to such writings 
and discoveries as are the result of intellectual labor. . . . It 
does not have any reference to labels which simply 
designate or describe the articles to which they are 
attached, and which have no value separated from the 
articles, and no possible influence upon science or the 
useful arts.38 
                                                 
 35. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 57–58. 
 36. Id. at 59. 
 37. Id. at 60. 
 38. 140 U.S. 428, 430–31 (1891) (citing The Trade-Mark Cases 100 U.S. 82 (1879)). 
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In so holding, however, the Court added a sentence of dicta 
that seemed to raise the level of originality even higher: 
To be entitled to a copyright the article must have by itself 
some value as a composition, at least to the extent of 
serving some purpose other than as a mere advertisement or 
designation of the subject to which it is attached.39 
This proposition would be challenged in the first Supreme Court 
copyright case decided in the 20th century. 
B. Early 20th Century: “Industrious Collection” 
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,40 the plaintiff 
Courier Lithographing Company (of which Bleistein was a 
co-owner) was commissioned to create three posters advertising 
“The Great Wallace Shows,” a circus.41 The defendant reproduced 
the posters, which had been properly registered for copyright, as 
the statute then required.42 The trial court directed a verdict for 
the defendant on statutory grounds, holding that the posters 
were not “pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine 
arts” within the meaning of the statute.43 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, construing the statute in 
accordance with what it saw as the constitutional purpose, in 
light of the four Supreme Court cases discussed above: 
  What we hold is this: that if a chromo, lithograph, or 
other print, engraving, or picture has no other use than 
that of a mere advertisement, and no value aside from this 
function, it would not be promotive of the useful arts, 
                                                 
 39. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). 
 40. 98 F. 608 (C.C.D. Ky. 1899), aff’d sub nom., Courier Lithographing Co. v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993 (6th Cir. 1900), rev’d sub nom., Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). For the historical background and an 
analysis of the case, see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Company: Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 77 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 
2005) [hereinafter Bleistein Story]. 
 41. Courier, 104 F. at 993; Bleistein Story, supra note 40, at 82. Bleistein was the 
former president and owner of the Buffalo Courier newspaper, of which Courier 
Lithographing was a spin-off. Id. at 81–82. 
 42. Id. at 993–94. 
 43. Bleistein, 98 F. at 610–11. The court also raised, but did not decide, a 
constitutional question: “Inasmuch as the constitutional provisions above referred to only 
authorizes congress to promote the ‘useful arts,’ the curious might moot the question of 
the power to promote any but the useful arts, and consequently the lack of power to 
legislate to give exclusive privileges respecting the fine arts.” Id. at 611. The trial court’s 
error in assuming that copyright was intended to promote the “useful Arts,” rather than 
“Science,” was repeated by both the Circuit Court of Appeals, 104 F. at 996, and the 
Supreme Court, 188 U.S. at 249. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
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within the meaning of the constitutional provision, to 
protect the “author” in the exclusive use thereof, and the 
copyright statute should not be construed as including such 
a publication . . . [A work] must have some connection with 
the fine arts to give it intrinsic value, and that it shall have 
is the meaning which we attach to the act . . . amending the 
provisions of the copyright law.44 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, 
reversed.45 It dismissed the constitutional argument in two brief 
sentences,46 and then set forth an extremely modest standard of 
originality: 
It is obvious also that the plaintiffs’ case is not affected by 
the fact . . . that the pictures represent actual groups—
visible things. . . . [E]ven if they had been drawn from the 
life, that fact would not deprive them of protection. The 
opposite proposition would mean that a portrait by 
Velasquez or Whistler was common property because others 
might try their hand on the same face. Others are free to 
copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy. The 
copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. 
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses 
its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest 
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one 
man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there 
is a restriction in the words of the act.47 
The Court construed the statutory phrase “pictorial 
illustrations” broadly, and implicitly distinguished Higgins v. 
Keuffel: 
[T]he act, however construed, does not mean that ordinary 
posters are not good enough to be considered within its 
scope. The antithesis to “illustrations or works connected 
with the fine arts” is not works of little merit or of humble 
degree, or illustrations addressed to the less educated 
                                                 
 44. Courier, 104 F. at 996. 
 45. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Justice Holmes 
was the newest member of the Court, having been appointed in 1902. The dissent, for two 
members of the Court, was written by Justice Harlan, who was the only Justice 
remaining from the Court that had decided The Trade-Mark Cases, Baker v. Selden, and 
Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony. 
 46. We shall do no more than mention the suggestion that painting and 
engraving, unless for a mechanical end, are not among the useful arts, the 
progress of which Congress is empowered by the Constitution to promote. The 
Constitution does not limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily 
needs. 
Id. at 249 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)).  
 47. Id. at 249–50 (citations omitted). 
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classes; it is “prints or labels designed to be used for any 
other articles of manufacture.” Certainly works are not the 
less connected with the fine arts because their pictorial 
quality attracts the crowd, and therefore gives them a real 
use—if use means to increase trade and to help to make 
money. A picture is none the less a picture, and none the 
less a subject of copyright, that it is used for an 
advertisement.48 
Finally, in a famous passage, the Court set forth what is now 
known as the “aesthetic non-discrimination principle”: 
  It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of 
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very 
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had 
learned the new language in which their author spoke. . . . 
At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures 
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. 
Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a 
commercial value—it would be bold to say that they have 
not an aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of 
any public is not to be treated with contempt.49 
Bleistein was widely interpreted as lowering the standard of 
originality that had been established in the late 18th-century 
cases.50 For example, in Cleland v. Thayer, the court held that a 
photograph of a natural landscape was copyrightable, without 
any inquiry into creativity.51 Under Bleistein, catalogs of fashion 
                                                 
 48. Id. at 251. 
 49. Id. at 251–52. For more on the aesthetic non-discrimination principle, see, for 
example, CRAIG JOYCE, TYLER OCHOA, MICHAEL CARROLL, MARSHALL LEAFFER & PETER 
JASZI, COPYRIGHT LAW 85 (10th ed. 2016). 
 50. Bleistein Story, supra note 40, at 101; Oren Bracha, Commentary on Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co. (1903), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) 
(2008), 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_us_1903 
[https://perma.cc/L3V3-BA83]; see, e.g., Ansehl v. Puritan Pharm. Co., 61 F.2d 131,  
134–35 (8th Cir. 1932) (“The Bleistein case established a new and liberal standard with 
respect to the originality or artistic merit required to entitle illustrated advertising 
matter . . . to the protection of copyright statutes.”); Empire City Amusement Co. v. 
Wilton, 134 F. 132, 133 (C.C.D. Mass. 1903) (“The Supreme Court has lately shown a 
tendency to widen, rather than to narrow, the scope of the copyright act.”) (citing 
Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239 (1903)). 
 51. 121 F. 71 (8th Cir. 1903); see also Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (3d Cir. 1903) 
(upholding copyright in a short motion picture of the launching of a yacht). 
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designs and brass fixtures were held to be copyrightable,52 as 
were labels and advertisements for goods consisting primarily of 
text.53 But the most significant effect of Bleistein was that it 
revived the notion that the investment of labor, by itself, was a 
sufficient basis for copyright protection. 
Several features of Holmes’s opinion in Bleistein suggested 
that labor alone may entitle a person to a copyright. First, in 
observing that “[o]thers are free to copy the original [but t]hey 
are not free to copy the copy,”54 the opinion implied that second 
comers had to independently discover facts, rather than copying 
facts from previous sources.55 Second, Holmes supported that 
statement by citing Blunt v. Patten, a case which had expressly 
held that labor in discovering facts was protected by copyright.56 
Third, the court stated that “[t]the least pretentious picture has 
more originality in it than directories and the like, which may be 
copyrighted.”57 Fourth, the opinion indicated that if a work had a 
commercial value, then it was protected by copyright, without 
regard to whether it had any aesthetic or educational value. 
Indeed, the Court added, “[t]hat these pictures had their worth 
and their success is sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce 
them without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights,”58 thus allowing a 
lower court to infer copyright protection from the very fact of 
copying, without any independent inquiry into originality or 
creativity at all.59 
Moreover, the 1909 Copyright Act could be read to support 
the labor theory of copyright. It offered protection to “all the 
                                                 
 52. See Nat’l Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911); J.H. 
White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro, 227 F. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
 53. See Ansehl, 61 F.2d at 136; Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 
F. 823 (8th Cir. 1924). 
 54. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249. 
 55. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself later cited Bleistein in holding that trade 
secret law could protect the prices of futures contracts traded on a public exchange. Bd. of 
Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250 (1905) (“The plaintiff has the right 
to keep the work which it has done, or paid for doing, to itself. The fact that others might 
do similar work, if they might, does not authorize them to steal the plaintiff’s.”) (citing 
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249–50). 
 56. 3 F. Cas. 762 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,579); see supra notes 20–22 and 
accompanying text. 
 57. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
 58. Id. at 252. 
 59. See, e.g., Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 F. 823, 828 (8th 
Cir. 1924) (recipes printed on a product label “serve to advance the culinary art. 
Defendant has tacitly admitted this, by appropriating them and distributing them in 
connection with its own products”). 
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writings of an author”60 and specified categories for registration, 
starting with “(a) Books, including composite and cyclopaedic 
works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations.”61 The 
statute thus suggested that directories and other compilations 
could be protected by copyright without regard to originality, 
except, of course, for the fact that previous case law had held that 
“originality” was implicit in the concept of “authorship.” 
The Supreme Court did not address the matter directly in 
International News Service v. Associated Press,62 but it did state 
in dicta that facts could not be copyrighted. Even though 
newspapers, like directories, were expressly mentioned in the 
1909 Copyright Act,63 and even assuming that a newspaper was 
properly published with notice and registered, the Court said: 
[T]he news element—the information respecting current 
events contained in the literary production—is not the 
creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that 
ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day. It is 
not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, 
when they empowered Congress ‘to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries[,]’ intended to confer upon one who 
might happen to be the first to report a historic event the 
exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of 
it.64 
It nonetheless held that the systematic copying of facts 
published by a direct competitor in the news-gathering business 
was unfair competition, and the language that it used could be 
read to support a labor theory of copyright: 
[Defendant] admits that it is taking material that has been 
acquired by complainant as the result of organization and 
the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is 
salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in 
appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to 
reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to 
newspapers that are competitors of complainant’s members 
                                                 
 60. Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 4, 35 Stat. 1076. 
 61. § 5(a), 35 Stat. at 1076. 
 62. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). For the historical background and an analysis of the case, 
see Douglas G. Baird, The Story of INS v. AP: Property, Natural Monopoly, and the 
Uneasy Legacy of a Concocted Controversy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 9 (Jane 
C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005). 
 63. § 5(b), 35 Stat. at 1076. 
 64. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234 (citations omitted). 
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is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have 
sown.65 
Moreover, the Court expressly quoted two British cases 
endorsing a labor theory of copyright.66 
The most important case supporting the labor theory of 
copyright was Jewelers’ Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone 
Publishing Co.67 The plaintiff’s work was a directory 
“contain[ing] the names and addresses of jewelers classified 
under different heads, arranged alphabetically, and opposite the 
name of each jeweler appeared the trade-names and trade-marks 
used by him.”68 Learned Hand, then a District Judge, held that 
the copyright was valid: “I think that the plaintiff’s book is 
clearly a ‘directory’ or an ‘other compilation,’ and as such it falls 
within section 5(a) of the Copyright Act . . . [I]t is not necessary 
in such cases that the matter compiled should itself be 
copyrighted; it may be in the public domain.”69 He also 
emphasized that the defendant had to verify the facts 
independently and could not copy them from the plaintiff: 
Any directory is a compilation, without opportunity for 
variety in the statement of the facts recorded. All are free to 
repeat those facts, just because they are facts. Strictly, it 
might have been logical, therefore, to deny it any 
protection, till the statute expressly granted one. . . . Yet in 
some way subsequent compilers must be allowed to state 
the same facts, and the question became what independent 
work they must do to acquire the requisite knowledge.70 
Hand declined to decide the case on the basis of copying 
facts, however, and instead held that the defendant infringed by 
copying the pictures of third-party trademarks included in the 
plaintiff’s directory.71 Even if the plaintiff’s pictures were 
themselves copied from drawings supplied by the trademark 
                                                 
 65. Id. at 239–40. 
 66. Id. at 244 (discussing Kelly v. Morris, L.R. 1 Eq. 697 (1866), and Morris v. 
Ashbee, L.R. 7 Eq. 34 (1868)). 
 67. 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 
581 (1922). 
 68. Id. at 933. 
 69. Id. at 934. 
 70. Id. at 935 (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. (“It appears to me quite enough that here the defendant copied the 
illustrations made by the plaintiff. . . . The plaintiff’s illustration was not the trade-mark 
itself, but a picture of it, prepared by the plaintiff. The defendant was . . . bound to make 
an independent picture of the object itself”). 
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owners, Hand held, the photos were subject to copyright under 
Bleistein: 
In those instances in which the trade-mark owners sent on 
illustrations which could be directly transferred to cuts by 
photography, . . . even as to these, [Bleistein] rules, because 
no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the 
personal influence of the author, and no two will be 
absolutely alike. Moreover, this all seems to me quite beside 
the point, because under section 5(j) photographs are 
protected, without regard to the degree of “personality” 
which enters into them.72 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that 
directories were copyrightable per se under Bleistein and the 
1909 Copyright Act.73 The court expressly endorsed the labor 
theory of copyright protection: 
  The right to copyright a book upon which one has 
expended labor in its preparation does not depend upon 
whether the materials which he has collected consist or not 
of matters which are publici juris, or whether such 
materials show literary skill or originality, either in 
thought or in language, or anything more than industrious 
collection. The man who goes through the streets of a town 
and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with 
their occupations and their street number, acquires 
material of which he is the author. He produces by his labor 
a meritorious composition, in which he may obtain a 
copyright . . .74 
The court also affirmed the finding that defendant infringed 
by copying pictures from the plaintiff’s directory, after sending 
them to the trademark owners to verify they were correct; and it 
confirmed infringement of the facts by the presence of common 
errors.75 It concluded: 
No one can legally take the results of the labor and expense 
which another has incurred in the publishing of his work, 
and thereby save himself “the expense and labor of working 
                                                 
 72. Id. at 934 (emphasis added). 
 73. Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 281 F. 83, 85 (2d Cir. 
1922). Note that the published Second Circuit opinion mistakenly moved the apostrophe 
in the plaintiff’s name. 
 74. Id. at 88. 
 75. Id. at 93–94. 
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out and arriving at those results by some independent 
road.”76 
Jeweler’s Circular was echoed by the Ninth Circuit in Leon v. 
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.77 Defendant Leon had copied 
information from a standard telephone directory issued by the 
plaintiffs, and had rearranged the information in numerical 
order to publish a reverse-lookup telephone directory.78 The court 
held that the copyright in plaintiff’s directory was valid, relying 
on both Bleistein and Jeweler’s Circular,79 and emphasizing the 
labor that went into compiling the plaintiff’s directory.80 The 
court also held that the copyright was infringed by copying the 
facts, even though they were rearranged in numerical order: 
[I]n preparing this book the defendants have utilized, 
wholesale and without permission, lists prepared by the 
plaintiffs at much trouble and expense. In so doing they 
have appropriated the result of this labor and expense to 
their own use, and even if they have injured the plaintiffs 
in no other way, they have at any rate deprived them of the 
advantage, which their copyright conferred on them.81 
Thus, by the mid-20th century, it was seemingly 
well-established that labor alone was a proper basis of copyright 
protection, and that second comers could not copy facts gathered 
by another without doing independent research. 
C.  A Detour: On the Origin of “Sweat of the Brow” 
The phrase “sweat of the brow” was first used in a copyright 
case in Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications.82 Ironically, 
however, in Amsterdam the district court denied copyright 
protection to the plaintiff’s map, which had been 
photographically copied by the defendant, on the ground that the 
                                                 
 76. Id. at 95. The opinion erroneously asserts that the quote is from Jeffreys v. 
Boosey (1854) 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 4 H.L.C. 815. In fact, the quote is from Morris v. Ashbee, 
L.R. 7 Eq. 34 (1868). The same quote was used by the Supreme Court in International 
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 244 (1918). 
 77. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937). 
 78. Id. at 484–85. 
 79. Id. at 486. 
 80. Id. at 485–86 (“It is obvious from this evidence that the business of getting out a 
directory is an expensive, complicated, well-organized endeavor, requiring skill, 
ingenuity, and original research.”). 
 81. Id. at 487 (quoting Weatherby & Sons v. Int’l Horse Agency & Exch. Ltd. [1910] 
2 Ch. 297 at 304 (Eng.)). 
 82. 93 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d, 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951). 
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plaintiff had merely copied the information on its map from other 
maps, without doing any independent surveying: 
  . . . Neither the plaintiff nor anyone on his behalf made 
any actual surveys or investigations of any roads, county 
lines, township lines, creeks, rivers or railroad lines. All 
this information was obtained from other maps in the 
plaintiff’s possession or in the possession of the township 
and municipal authorities. . . . 
 . . . The plaintiff spent considerable time and effort to 
assemble and prepare this information for publication but 
did very little, if any, original work. . . . 
 . . . The presentation of ideas in the form of books, 
movies, music and other similar creative work is protected 
by the Copyright Act. However, the presentation of 
information available to everybody, such as is found on 
maps, is protected only when the publisher of the map in 
question obtains originally some of that information by the 
sweat of his own brow. Almost anybody could combine the 
information from several maps onto one map, but not 
everybody can go out and get that information originally 
and then transcribe it into a map. 
The Third Circuit affirmed the result on the opinion of the 
District Court,83 adding: “We think there is no doubt that in 
order for a map to be copyrightable its preparation must involve 
a modicum of creative work.”84 
The reasoning and result in Amsterdam is the complete 
opposite of the industrious collection cases. The court expressly 
found that the plaintiff had expended labor in compiling its map, 
and that the defendant had photographed the defendant’s map as 
a starting point, while adding various historic sites. Nonetheless, 
it denied copyright protection, announcing a standard of 
originality that would exclude virtually all compilations of 
information. 
Fortunately, the “no mercy to compilers” approach adopted 
in Amsterdam appears to be something of a dead end in the case 
law. It was cited in only a handful of cases denying copyright 
protection,85 and it was just as frequently cited in cases finding 
                                                 
 83. Amsterdam, 189 F.2d at 105–06. 
 84. Id. at 106. 
 85. See, e.g., M.M. Bus. Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1139–40 (6th Cir. 
1973) (denying copyright to business form); Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Serv., 
426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970) (denying protection to a paragraph of legal 
boilerplate, six sentences long, printed at the bottom of plaintiff’s invoices, because “[t]he 
plaintiff did no original legal research which resulted in a significant addition to the 
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sufficient originality.86 Amsterdam was expressly rejected by the 
court in United States v. Hamilton,87 in which Judge (and future 
Justice) Anthony Kennedy correctly held that originality could 
consist of an original selection and arrangement of public domain 
elements: 
We rule that elements of compilation which amount to more 
than a matter of trivial selection may . . . support a finding 
that a map is sufficiently original to merit copyright 
protection. . . . [T]he elements of authorship embodied in a 
map consist not only of the depiction of a previously 
undiscovered landmark or the correction or improvement of 
scale or placement, but also in selection, design, and 
synthesis.88 
The first case to apply the label “sweat of the brow” to the 
industrious collection doctrine was Southern Bell Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Associated Telephone Directory Publishers.89 
There, the court correctly held that originality of a Yellow Pages 
telephone directory (business listings classified by category, with 
illustrations) was satisfied “where the directory is the product of 
subjective ‘selection, organization, and arrangement of the 
preexisting materials,’”90 and it agreed with the treatise Nimmer 
on Copyright that “‘industriousness of the efforts to develop the 
information’ is not relevant to a determination of originality 
under the copyright statute.”91 In the next half-decade, however, 
                                                 
standard conditional sales contract,” but “he merely made trivial word changes by 
combining various forms and servilely imitating the already stereotyped language found 
therein”). 
 86. See, e.g., Andrien v. S. Ocean Cty. Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 134 & 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1991); City of Ventura v. Blackburn, 362 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1966). 
 87. 583 F.2d 448, 450–51 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 88. Id. at 452. The court did note, however, that “merely trivial additions to or 
omissions from a preexisting map will not support a copyright . . . . For example, copying 
the outline of the United States and the boundaries of each state cannot be said to involve 
any element of original choice or arrangement.” Id. at 452 n.5. Accord, Darden v. Peters, 
488 F.3d 277, 287–88 (4th Cir. 1990) (minor variations to U.S. census maps were not 
sufficiently original for purposes of copyright registration). 
 89. 756 F.2d 801, 809 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985). An earlier case, Eckes v. Card Prices 
Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984), had used the phrase in stating that “the fruits of 
another’s labor in lieu of independent research obtained through the sweat of a 
researcher’s brow, does not merit copyright protection absent, perhaps, wholesale 
appropriation,” id. at 862, but Eckes did not cite any of the industrious collection cases or 
any cases involving directories. 
 90. Southern Bell, 756 F.2d at 809 (quoting NEIL BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 2:19 
(1981)). 
 91. Id. (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (1984)). Nimmer apparently was 
the first treatise author to question the “industrious collection” doctrine, as evidenced in 
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other courts facing directory cases also began to refer to the 
industrious collection doctrine as “sweat of the brow,” either in 
upholding claims to copyright based on industrious collection92 or 
in rejecting the industrious collection doctrine.93 
Thus, by the time Feist was decided in 1991, the Supreme 
Court legitimately could say that “the underlying notion . . . that 
copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into 
compiling facts” was “known alternatively as ‘sweat of the brow’ 
or ‘industrious collection.’”94 But that statement had been true for 
only about six years. Prior to that, the two doctrines were 
separate and stood for entirely opposite propositions. It is 
therefore somewhat ironic that Feist would forever equate the 
“industrious collection” doctrine with the label “sweat of the 
brow.” 
D.  Late 20th Century: Precursors of Change 
During the second half of the 20th century, prior to Feist, 
some courts continued to apply the industrious collection doctrine 
in cases involving maps and directories.95 In one notable 
example, the doctrine made an appearance in a case involving an 
extensively-researched biography of Hans Christian Andersen. In 
Toskvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., the defendant was held to have 
infringed twenty-four passages (translated from Danish sources) 
                                                 
the quoted passage above, although he did not refer to the doctrine by that name, nor did 
he use the phrase “sweat of the brow.” 
 92. See, e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer [sic] Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128,  
131–32 (8th Cir. 1985); Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Co. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 719 
F. Supp. 1551, 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1988), rev’d, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc); 
Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 698, 708 (D. 
Minn. 1987). 
 93. See, e.g., Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 201 n.2 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Inv’rs Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(“To grant copyright protection based merely on the ‘sweat of the author’s brow’ would 
risk putting large areas of factual research material off limits and threaten the public’s 
unrestrained access to information.”). 
 94. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1991). 
 95. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 
1990), vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 944 (1991); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer [sic] 
Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131–32 (8th Cir. 1985); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. 
Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1985); Schroeder v. William Morrow & 
Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5–6 (7th Cir. 1977). The doctrine also influenced the outcome in West 
Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1227–28 (8th Cir. 1986), in which the 
court held that the arrangement of cases in West’s volumes was infringed by Lexis’s use of 
“star pagination” to indicate the page breaks in the published volumes. See infra notes 
253–62 and accompanying text; see also L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the 
Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 719 (1989) (criticizing the decision). 
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from the plaintiff’s book in her own work.96 In rejecting a claim of 
fair use, the court said: “The question is not whether [defendant] 
Hubbard could have obtained the same information by going to 
the same sources, but rather did she go to the same sources and 
do her own independent research?”97 
In other cases involving factual research and nonfiction 
works, however, a number of courts cast doubt on the industrious 
collection doctrine. A leading case was Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Random House, Inc., in which Howard Hughes bought the 
copyrights to a series of magazine articles and used them to sue 
Random House for allegedly infringing the copyrights in 
publishing an unauthorized biography of him.98 In reversing a 
preliminary injunction against the book on the grounds of fair 
use, the court added: 
One other aspect of the district court’s decision bears 
discussion. While recognizing that historical fact and events 
in themselves are in the public domain and are not entitled 
to copyright protection, and that a writer may be guided by 
earlier copyrighted works, the court asserted in sweeping 
language that an author is not entitled to utilize the fruits 
of another’s labor in lieu of independent research . . . With 
this conclusion we disagree as a matter of law. . . . 
[We] cannot subscribe to the view that an author is 
absolutely precluded from saving time and effort by 
referring to and relying upon prior published material. It is 
just such wasted effort that the proscription against the 
copyright of ideas and facts, and to a lesser extent the 
privilege of fair use, are designed to prevent.99 
Another important case in the Second Circuit was Hoehling 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,100 which involved a claim that a 
historical novel, The Hindenburg, and a movie based on it, 
infringed plaintiff’s nonfiction book, in which he concluded that 
the airship had been sabotaged. The plaintiff “claim[ed] that a 
number of specific facts, ascertained through his personal 
research, were copied by appellees.”101 The court rejected the 
infringement claim: 
                                                 
 96. 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950). 
 97. Id. at 667. 
 98. 366 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 99. Id. at 309–10. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The last sentence was 
adapted from Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and 
Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1584 (1963) (criticizing Toskvig). 
 100. 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 101. Id. at 979. 
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The cases in this circuit . . . make clear that factual 
information is in the public domain. Each appellee had the 
right to avail himself of the facts contained in Hoehling’s 
book and to use such information, whether correct or 
incorrect, in his own literary work. Accordingly, there is 
little consolation in relying on cases in other circuits 
holding that the fruits of original research are 
copyrightable. . . . 
  In works devoted to historical subjects, it is our view that 
a second author may make significant use of prior work, so 
long as he does not bodily appropriate the expression of 
another . . . Knowledge is expanded as well by granting new 
authors of historical works a relatively free hand to build 
upon the work of their predecessors.102 
The Fifth Circuit relied on both Rosemont and Hoehling in 
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.103 which involved plaintiff’s 
book about a real-life kidnapping and a TV movie about the same 
incident, but allegedly copied from the book. The trial judge first 
correctly instructed the jury that “the facts themselves are not 
copyrightable but the form of expression of the facts and their 
arrangement and selection are copyrightable.”104 Then he added 
the challenged instruction: “Moreover, if an author, in writing a 
book concerning factual matters, engages in research on those 
matters, his research is copyrightable.”105 In other words: 
The [trial] court interpreted the copyright law to reward not 
only the effort and ingenuity involved in giving expression 
to facts, but also the efforts involved in discovering and 
exposing facts. In its view, an author could not be expected 
to expend his time and money in gathering facts if he knew 
those facts, and the profits to be derived therefrom, could be 
pirated by one who could then avoid the expense of 
obtaining the facts himself.106 
 The Fifth Circuit began its doctrinal analysis of the 
question “Is Research Copyrightable?” with a basic proposition: 
  It is well settled that copyright protection extends only to 
an author’s expression of facts and not to the facts 
themselves. . . . Obviously, a fact does not originate with the 
author of a book describing the fact. Neither does it 
                                                 
 102. Id. at 979 (relying on Rosemont and noting that it repudiated Toskvig); see also 
id. at 980. 
 103. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 104. Id. at 1368. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1369. 
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originate with one who “discovers” the fact. “The discoverer 
merely finds and records. He may not claim that the facts 
are ‘original’ with him although there may be originality 
and hence authorship in the manner of reporting, i.e., the 
‘expression,’ of the facts.” [1 Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 2.03(E), at 2-34 (1980).] Thus, since facts do not owe their 
origin to any individual, they may not be copyrighted and 
are part of the public domain available to every person.107 
 The Fifth Circuit’s opinion then acknowledged an obvious 
problem: 
 It is difficult to adequately distinguish some of the 
directory cases, and particularly the language of the 
opinions. A copyright in a directory, however, is properly 
viewed as resting on the originality of the selection and 
arrangement of the factual material, rather than on the 
industriousness of the efforts to develop the information. 
See Nimmer, supra, at § 3.04. . . . 
 In any event, it may be better to recognize the directory 
cases as being in a category by themselves rather than to 
attempt to bring their result and rationale to bear on 
nondirectory cases.108 
Nonetheless, it held that the trial judge’s instruction was 
improper: 
 We find the approach taken by the Second Circuit in 
Hoehling and Rosemont to be more consistent with the 
purpose and intended scope of protection under the 
copyright law than that implied by Toksvig. The line drawn 
between uncopyrightable facts and copyrightable 
expression of facts serves an important purpose in 
copyright law. It provides a means of balancing the public’s 
interest in stimulating creative activity, as embodied in the 
Copyright Clause, against the public’s need for 
unrestrained access to information. It allows a subsequent 
author to build upon and add to prior accomplishments 
without unnecessary duplication of effort. . . . 
 The valuable distinction in copyright law between facts 
and the expression of facts cannot be maintained if research 
is held to be copyrightable. There is no rational basis for 
distinguishing between facts and the research involved in 
obtaining facts. To hold that research is copyrightable is no 
more or no less than to hold that the facts discovered as a 
result of research are entitled to copyright protection. . . . 
                                                 
 107. Id. at 1368–69. 
 108. Id. at 1369–70. 
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We conclude that the district court erred in instructing the 
jury that research is copyrightable.109 
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit also revisited the 
industrious collection doctrine. In Worth v. Selchow & Righter 
Co.,110 the plaintiff claimed that the defendants had infringed his 
trivia book in creating their hit board game Trivial Pursuit. The 
defendants acknowledged they had consulted Worth’s book, along 
with numerous other sources, in developing their game, but 
denied infringement.111 The court held that “facts, like ideas, are 
never protected by copyright law,” because “[t]he discovery of a 
fact, regardless of the quantum of labor and expense, is simply 
not the work of an author.”112 Worth’s selection had not been 
copied, because only 3,976 of his 12,000 entries had been used;113 
and Worth’s arrangement was not copied, because Worth 
arranged his material in alphabetical order, while the defendants 
arranged their trivia questions in random order in six color-coded 
categories.114 Finally, the court added, “to the extent that Leon 
suggests that research or labor is protectable, later cases have 
rejected that theory.”115 
Thus, by the time Feist was decided in 1991, both the Second 
and Ninth Circuits had repudiated the “industrious collection” 
doctrine that they had set forth in Jeweler’s Circular and Leon, 
respectively. Other circuits, however, continued to apply the 
doctrine in cases involving maps and directories. This circuit 
split led the Court to grant certiorari in Feist, setting the stage 
for a fundamental reappraisal of originality in copyright law. 
III. ANALYZING FEIST 
A. The Parties and the Dispute 
The origin of the controversy in Feist is a fascinating case 
study of small business in the American heartland in the 
mid-20th century.116 In February 1951, a group of farmers and 
                                                 
 109. Id. at 1371–72. 
 110. 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 111. Id. at 570–71. 
 112. Id. at 572 (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11[E], at 2–169 (1987 ed.)). 
 113. Id. at 573 & n.6. 
 114. Id. at 573. 
 115. Id. at 573 (citing, inter alia, Miller, Hoehling, and Rosemont). 
 116. Before beginning, it may be helpful to clarify the nomenclature of references to 
the case at various levels of decision. As indicated in note 1, in this Essay the term “Feist”, 
standing alone, refers to the opinion of the Supreme Court. Hereinafter, “Rural I” refers 
to the district court’s opinion granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment at  663 F. 
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businessmen in northwest Kansas incorporated Rural Telephone 
Service Company (“Rural”) as a non-profit cooperative 
association, with the goal of providing improved telephone 
service for the region.117 They sought funding from the federal 
Rural Electrification Administration, which, as a result of an 
amendment enacted sixteen months earlier, was empowered to 
make loans to finance the extension and improvement of 
telephone service in rural areas.118 Three years later, Rural 
began providing service to 524 members in three Kansas 
towns.119 Three decades after that, Rural was providing 
telephone service to about 4,700 members, spread over rural 
areas in several counties in northwest Kansas.120 
Federal law stipulated that all telephone companies 
receiving federal funds would nonetheless continue to be subject 
to state regulation.121 Accordingly, Rural was regulated by the 
Kansas Corporation Commission, which required all telephone 
companies in Kansas to issue a telephone directory annually.122 
Accordingly, in October of each year, Rural published a typical 
telephone directory, containing both white pages and yellow 
pages.123 The white pages listed the names, towns, and telephone 
numbers of all of Rural’s subscribers, arranged in alphabetical 
                                                 
Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987), whereas “Rural II” refers to that court’s ruling on defendant’s 
counterclaim, alleging that plaintiff’s refusal to license its white pages directory listings 
constituted a violation of federal antitrust law, at 737 F. Supp. 610  (D. Kan. 1990). 
 117. NEX-TECH, https://www.nex-tech.com/about.Aspx [https://perma.cc/5ZXR-68VX]. 
 118. Act of Oct. 28, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-423, ch. 776, § 5, 63 Stat. 948–49 (adding 
Title II, § 201, to the Rural Electrification Act of 1936), codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 922; U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Admin., Misc. Publ. No. 823: RURAL 
TELEPHONE SERVICE U.S.A.: A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 
ADMINISTRATION’S TELEPHONE LOAN PROGRAM 2 (May 1960) [hereinafter RURAL 
TELEPHONE SERVICE]. 
 119. NEX-TECH, https://www.nex-tech.com/about.Aspx [https://perma.cc/5ZXR-68VX]. 
 120. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. (Rural II), 737 F. Supp. 610, 612 (D. 
Kan. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 957 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1992); see also id. at 625 (map 
of Rural’s service area). The facts are taken from the district court’s opinion on the 
antitrust counterclaim in the same case. The record is unclear as to whether the number 
of subscribers cited was as of the date of the complaint (1983) or as of the date of the 
opinion (1990). 
 121. Pub. L. No. 81-423, § 5, 63 Stat. 949 (adding Title II, § 202) (codified at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 923). This stipulation was important in securing passage of the amendment. RURAL 
TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 118, at 7. 
 122. Rural II, 737 F. Supp. at 612 (Finding of Fact No. 2); Kansas Corporation 
Commission, Directive of May 1, 1967, on Issuance of Telephone Directories (“all 
telephone companies operating in the State of Kansas [shall] issue at least annually a 
dated telephone directory”). The Commission’s Directive is reproduced in Appendix 1. 
 123. Rural II, 737 F. Supp. at 612 (Finding of Fact No. 2); id. at 614 (Finding of Fact 
No. 13). 
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order by last name.124 The yellow pages contained business 
listings, arranged alphabetically within various categories, 
together with classified advertisements of various sizes.125 Like 
most phone companies, Rural used the advertising revenue from 
the yellow pages to subsidize the cost of publishing its 
directory.126 
Feist Publications, Inc. (“Feist”), was a family-run 
corporation, founded by Tom and Roberta Feist of Spearville, 
Kansas, in 1977.127 In rural Kansas, it was common for people to 
drive from one small town to another to buy necessities.128 But 
because Kansas was covered by a patchwork quilt of telephone 
companies,129 Tom, a farmer and former high school teacher, saw 
the need for a directory that combined information from all of the 
small towns in a larger area.130 He partnered with Lawrence 
Vierthaler, publisher of the local newspaper, to produce the first 
Feist Area-Wide Directory, covering southwest Kansas, in 
1978.131 
                                                 
 124. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991). The district 
court opinions state that Rural’s directory lists the addresses of its subscribers, Rural 
Telephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc. (Rural I), 663 F. Supp. 214, 216 (D. Kan. 
1987), counterclaim addressed at 737 F. Supp. 610, 612 (D. Kan. 1990) (Finding of Fact 
No. 2), but the actual directory for 1977–1978 shows that only the town names are listed. 
 125. Rural I, 663 F. Supp. at 216; Rural II, 737 F. Supp. at 612 (Finding of Fact No. 
2). 
 126. Feist, 499 U.S. at 342. Because Rural was a non-profit cooperative, all revenues 
that exceeded the cost of doing business were refunded to its member-subscribers through 
“capital credits” on their phone bills. Rural II, 737 F. Supp. at 612 (Finding of Fact No. 1). 
 127. Yellow Book USA Acquires Feist Publications, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 24, 2004), 
www.thefreelibrary.com/Yellow+Book+USA+Acquires+Feist+Publications,+Inc.-a011459 
8205 [https://perma.cc/D9TZ-W2B2] 
 128. Tricia Pemberton, City Branch of the Feist Family Enjoys Directory Business 
Role, NEWSOK (Feb. 29, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/1891993 
[https://perma.cc/FXY9-J8YM]. 
 129. For example, eleven different telephone companies provided service in the 
fifteen-county area of northwest Kansas. Feist, 499 U.S. at 343; see also Rural II, 737 F. 
Supp. at 625 (map of Rural’s service area). 
 130. Pemberton, supra note 128; Bill Wilson, Feist Publications Patriarch Dies at 77, 
WICHITA EAGLE (Jan. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM). http://www.kansas.com/news/business/ 
article1052756.html [https://perma.cc/2GVH-TLVP]. Rural also saw this need, and began 
licensing listings in adjacent communities from other phone companies at a cost of 1 cent 
to 49 cents per name. Rural II, 737 F. Supp. at 613 (Finding of Fact No. 9). This accounts 
for the discrepancy between the number of Rural’s subscribers (4,700), id. at 612 (Finding 
of Fact No. 1), and the number of listings in Rural’s white pages directory (7,700). Feist, 
499 U.S. at 343. 
 131. Wilson, supra note 130, ¶ 17–20. The NewsOK article, supra note 128, 
erroneously asserts that Feist was the owner of the publishing company and published 
the newspaper. In fact, Lawrence Vierthaler was the publisher of the newspaper and 
owned the printing equipment that was used by Feist for the first few years of operation. 
Telephone interview with Bruce Vierthaler, June 21, 2016 (notes on file with Author). 
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Tom Feist next sought to publish a directory covering 
northwest Kansas. In order to do so, he offered to buy listings 
from the eleven telephone companies that provided service 
within the fifteen-county area.132 Ten of the telephone companies 
agreed to license their listings to Feist, at a cost of between 1 
cent and 49 cents per name.133 On April 28, 1978, Tom Feist 
attended a meeting of Rural’s Board of Directors and offered to 
buy its listings for 10 cents per name.134 After he left the 
meeting, the Board unanimously voted to table the request 
indefinitely.135 In later ruling on Feist’s antitrust counterclaim, 
the District Court specifically found that “[t]he refusal to deal 
was not motivated by a legitimate business reason, but by an 
intent to exclude competition in the yellow pages advertising 
market in the [Rural’s] service area.”136 
Concerned that “omitting these listings would have left a 
gaping hole in its area-wide directory, rendering it less attractive 
to potential yellow pages advertisers,”137 Feist obtained a copy of 
Rural’s 1977–1978 Directory, eliminated all the listings outside 
Feist’s coverage area, and sorted the remaining listings by 
town.138 In the District Court’s narration: 
Feist then sent the various lists, broken down by towns, to 
verifiers it had hired in each of the towns that the directory 
would cover, with instructions to telephone each of the 
listings taken from [Rural’s] directory, and to attempt to 
verify each name, address and telephone number. After the 
verifiers had carried out their instructions, they sent the 
lists back to Feist with penciled in notes reflecting 
deletions, additions and any other changes.139 
Initially, Feist did not include any Rural subscribers that it 
had not independently verified.140 As a result, the Feist directory 
was only about 70 percent complete within Rural’s service 
area.141 
                                                 
After that, Feist contracted to publish its directories with R.R. Donnelly & Sons, Inc., of 
Chicago. Id. 
 132. Feist, 499 U.S. at 343. 
 133. Rural II, 737 F. Supp. at 612 (Finding of Fact No. 5). 
 134. Id. at 612–13 (Finding of Fact No. 6). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 613 (Finding of Fact No. 7). 
 137. Feist, 499 U.S. at 343. 
 138. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. (Rural I), 663 F. Supp. 214, 217 (D. 
Kan. 1987), aff’d mem., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 139. Id. at 217. 
 140. Rural II, 737 F. Supp. at 613 (Finding of Fact No. 10). 
 141. Id. at 614 (Finding of Fact No. 15). 
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For the next four years, Feist updated its directory using its 
own verifiers and made only minimal use of Rural’s directory.142 
In 1983, however, Feist again used Rural’s listings (from its 
1982–1983 directory) as a starting point for the names within 
Rural’s service area.143 After removing the listings outside its 
coverage area, Feist “hired personnel to investigate the 4,935 
that remained.”144 In the words of the Supreme Court: 
As a result, a typical Feist listing includes the individual’s 
street address; most of Rural’s listings do not. 
Notwithstanding these additions, however, 1,309 of the 
46,878 listings in Feist’s 1983 directory were identical to 
listings in Rural’s 1982–1983 white pages. Four of these 
were fictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its 
directory to detect copying.145 
On March 23, 1983, Rural filed suit against Feist in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging copyright 
infringement.146 Feist filed an antitrust counterclaim based on 
Rural’s refusal to license its white page listings.147 With regard to 
the copyright claim, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Rural, explaining that “courts have consistently held 
that telephone directories are copyrightable”148 and citing a 
string of lower court decisions, including Leon. In an unpublished 
opinion reproduced in Appendix 3 to this Article, the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed “for substantially the reasons given by the 
District Court.”149 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to 
determine whether the copyright in Rural’s directory protected 
the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist.”150 
Specifically, the grant was “limited to Question 3 presented by 
                                                 
 142. Rural I, 663 F. Supp. at 217. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 343 (1991). 
 145. Id. The covers of the two directories are shown in Appendix 2. 
 146. Docket, Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., Case No. 5:83-CV-04086, U.S. 
District Court, District of Kansas. 
 147. The District Court granted summary judgment to Feist on its antitrust 
counterclaim, awarding $33,000 in damages, trebled to $99,000 (about 16 times what it 
awarded to Rural on the copyright infringement claim). Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610, 623-24 (D. Kan. 1990). After the Supreme Court’s ruling 
on the copyright claim, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that anticompetitive 
intent was not sufficient without evidence of actual injury to competition. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 957 F.2d 765, 768–69 (10th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court 
denied Feist’s petition for certiorari on the antitrust counterclaim. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 506 U.S. 984 (1992). 
 148. Rural I, 663 F. Supp. at 218. 
 149. Feist, 499 U.S. at 343. 
 150. Id. 
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the petition,”151 namely: “Does the copyright in a telephone 
directory by the telephone company prevent access to that 
directory as a source of names and numbers to compile a 
competing directory, or does copyright protection extend only to 
the selection, coordination, or arrangement of those names and 
numbers?”152 
B. The Opinion and Its Sources 
The opening sentence of Justice O’Connor’s decision for a 
unanimous Court153 reads: “This case requires us to clarify the 
extent of copyright protection available to telephone directory 
white pages.”154 That description of the opinion to come is 
deceptively simple and dramatically understates what follows. As 
the organization of the opinion and its penultimate paragraph,155 
in particular, make clear, Feist is really two opinions for the price 
of one. 
The opinion ultimately concludes that, “[a]s a statutory 
matter, 17 U.S.C. § 101 [defining a ‘compilation’] does not afford 
                                                 
 151. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 498 U.S. 808 (1990) (granting 
certiorari). 
 152. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit at i; Brief for the Petitioner at *i, 1990 WL 513112 (Nov. 15, 1990). 
 153. Feist, 499 U.S. 340. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Marshall, 
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined in the judgment and in O’Connor’s opinion. 
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment but not in the opinion. The papers of 
Justices currently open to the public at the Library of Congress do not explain why 
Justice Blackmun declined to join the opinion; but Blackmun’s notes indicate that, 
initially, both he and Chief Justice Rehnquist were inclined to affirm the 10th Circuit’s 
opinion. The opinion by Justice O’Connor then proceeded through three drafts: February 
7, February 21, and March 25. In response to the second draft, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
indicated on February 22, 1991 that he would join the O’Connor opinion. On the same 
date, Justice Blackmun advised simply in a letter to O’Connor: “At the end of your 
opinion, would you please note that I concur in the judgment.” Blackmun Papers, supra 
note 3. 
Justice O’Connor’s papers currently reside in a “Raiders of the Lost Ark”-style 
warehouse in Washington, D.C.’s Maryland suburbs. According to the Library of 
Congress, they will not be opened, per the Justice’s instructions, while any Justice who 
participated in the decision of a particular case continues to serve on the Supreme Court. 
Justice O’Connor’s instructions were likely influenced by Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist’s letter criticizing the Library of Congress for opening the papers of Justice 
Thurgood Marshall to researchers only four months after his death, even though many of 
the cases discussed in his files had been decided by members of the Court then still 
sitting. See Neil A. Lewis, Chief Justice Assails Library on Release of Marshall Papers, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/26/us/chief-justice-assails-
library-on-release-of-marshall-papers.html [http://nyti.ms/2endXIu]; see also Kathryn A. 
Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1680–86 (2013). 
 154. Feist, 499 U.S. at 342. 
 155. Id. at 363–64. 
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protection from copying to a collection of facts that are selected, 
coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks 
originality.”156 That construction of 17 U.S.C. § 101, however, 
depends upon not only the statutory provision cited but also upon 
the last word of the foregoing sentence: originality. Yet 
“originality” is not defined by Title 17. Where to turn next? The 
obvious answer is: the Constitution and the case law. But 
because neither was entirely clear on the matter, the Court in 
Feist was left mostly to its own devices to provide its other 
conclusion: “As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only 
those constituent elements of a work [not just a compilation but 
any work] that possess more than a de minimis quantum of 
creativity.”157 
From a Justice often known for the narrowness and 
precision of her opinions, the constitutional aspect of Feist seems 
quite remarkable.158 Chief Justice Roberts has described “the 
cardinal principle of judicial restraint” as follows: “if it is not 
necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”159 In 
Feist, Justice O’Connor and her fellow Justices apparently 
perceived that, in the case presented, the Court was required to 
do more than construe the meaning of the word “compilation” in 
17 U.S.C. § 101. To resolve the case, it was necessary for the 
Court to define the word “originality,” one of the two specified 
                                                 
 156. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the oral argument in the case contained a portent 
of things to come: 
QUESTION [by Justice O’Connor]: Don’t we now have in the ‘76 act a definition 
of compilation that we have to look to? 
MR. CAPLINGER [for Respondent Rural Telephone Service Company]: Yes, 
Justice O’Connor. The— 
QUESTION: And we have to apply that section, 101, I take it? 
MR. CAPLINGER: No, Justice O’Connor. 
QUESTION: No? 
MR. CAPLINGER: No. . . . 
QUESTION: . . . [Y]ou think we don’t have to apply the definition in the act of 
what is a compilation? 
MR. CAPLINGER: Justice O’Connor, I don’t think you have to, but I would 
recommend that the Court do—do so. 
QUESTION: Well, I would think that’s exactly where we’d look. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29–30, 1991 WL 636568 (Jan. 10, 1990). 
 157. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added). 
 158. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Justice O’Connor’s Opinion in Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co.: An Uncommon Though Characteristic Approach, 38 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 83, 87–88 (1991) [hereinafter Hamilton, Characteristic Approach]; Marci A. 
Hamilton, Justice O’Connor’s Intellectual Property Opinions, 13 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 
71, 73–74 (1991) [hereinafter Hamilton, Intellectual Property Opinions]. 
 159. PDK Laboratories v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F.3d 786, 799 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
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prerequisites to copyright protection in § 102(a),160 as a proxy for 
the constitutional injunction to accord copyright protection only 
to “Authors.”161 
Here, then, are the two issues addressed by the opinion in 
Feist, in the sequence advanced by the Court itself. 
1. The Constitutional Issue 
a. Analyzing the Opinion. In the opening paragraphs of 
Part II.A of her opinion, Justice O’Connor described the facts 
presented to the Court as involving an “undeniable tension” 
between “two well-established propositions”: “The first is that 
facts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of fact 
generally are.”162 
In support of the first proposition, O’Connor cited her own 
opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises: 
“No author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.”163 
In support of the second proposition, Justice O’Connor referenced 
generally the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, both of which 
expressly mention “compilations.”164 
According to the opinion, the key to resolving the tension 
between the two propositions identified lies in understanding 
why facts are not copyrightable. 
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for 
copyright protection, a work must be original to the 
author. See Harper & Row, supra, [471 U.S.] at 547–549. 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that 
the work was independently created by the author (as 
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at 
least some minimal degree of creativity. 1 M. Nimmer & D. 
Nimmer, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990). . . . To be sure, 
the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a 
slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make 
the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, 
“no matter how crude, humble or obvious” it might 
be. . . . Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be 
                                                 
 160. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a): “Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .” Besides 
originality, the second prerequisite for protection, obviously, is the fixation of a “Writing.” 
 161. See infra notes 162–75 and accompanying text. 
 162. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344. 
 163. Id. at 345 (quoting Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 
(1985)). 
 164. Id. at 345; see Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5(a), 35 Stat. 1076; 17 
U.S.C. § 103(a). 
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original even though it closely resembles other works, so 
long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of 
copying.165 
The source of the sine qua non, the opinion continues, is the 
Constitution (“Originality is a constitutional requirement”), as 
construed in two decisions from the late 19th century: The 
Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony.166 The Trade-Mark Cases are cited for the principle that, 
for a particular work to be classified “under the head of writings 
of authors, . . . originality is required.”167 According to Feist, that 
opinion “explained that originality requires independent creation 
plus a modicum of creativity.”168 Burrow-Giles “distilled the same 
requirement from the Constitution’s use of the word ‘authors,’” 
defining that term, “in a constitutional sense, to mean ‘he to 
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker.’”169 
Summing up its review of the foundational cases and moving 
on to the present, the Feist Court thus observed: 
The originality requirement . . . remains the touchstone of 
copyright protection today. . . . Leading scholars agree on 
this point. As one pair of commentators succinctly puts it: 
“The originality requirement is constitutionally mandated 
for all works.” Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: 
The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and 
Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 719, 763, n.155 
(1989) (emphasis in original) (hereinafter Patterson & 
Joyce). Accord, id., at 759–760, and n. 140; Nimmer 
§ 1.06[A] (“[O]riginality is a statutory as well as a 
constitutional requirement”).170 
                                                 
 165. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (emphasis in third sentence added). 
 166. Id. at 346. The opinion cites The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), and 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). Both cases are discussed 
extensively in Part II.A. above. 
 167. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94). 
 168. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. Feist does not define what a “modicum of creativity” 
might mean, particularly in the context of compilations. In the block quote in the text 
immediately above, the opinion notes that the requisite level of creativity is “extremely 
low” and that “a slight amount will suffice . . . no matter how crude, humble or obvious” 
that creativity might be. Id. at 345. Elsewhere in Part II.A., the opinion observes that, 
while copyright protection for factual compilations is “thin,” it may be merited by the 
author’s “choices” and “subjectivi[ty]” regarding the “selection and arrangement” of the 
preexisting materials included in the compilation. Id. at 348–49. 
 169. Id. at 346 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58). 
 170. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. The appeal of the Patterson and Joyce article to the Court 
may have been attributable to two possible reasons. First, like telephone white pages 
directories, the computer databases in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, 799 
F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987), are the subject of limited 
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The Court then explained that “[i]t is this bedrock principle 
of copyright that mandates the law’s seemingly disparate 
treatment of facts and factual compilations.”171 To put the point 
succinctly, “Facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship,” 
because facts are discovered, not created.172 “Factual 
compilations, on the other hand, may possess the requisite 
originality,” because “[t]he compilation author typically chooses 
which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to 
arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by 
readers.”173 
Before passing onto the statutory issue of which factual 
compilations do (and do not) qualify for copyright protection, 
however, a word about the sources of the Feist opinion on the 
constitutional issue. 
b. Sources of the Constitutional Analysis.174  As to case law, 
the opinion relies strongly on The Trade-Mark Cases and 
Burrow-Giles v. Sarony. Nonetheless, to put primary emphasis 
on those decisions would be to misperceive Feist’s most important 
case-law source: Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.175 Harper 
& Row is the first-cited, and by far most often-cited, decision in 
the Feist opinion. It is Justice O’Connor’s own opinion for a 6-3 
Court, handed down less than a decade before Feist itself. 
Harper & Row involved a magazine, The Nation, “scooping” 
a book publisher, Harper & Row, by publicly disseminating 
excerpts from former president Gerald R. Ford memoir (including 
his pardon of Richard M. Nixon after the Watergate scandal), 
obtained by what the Court described as a “purloined” 
manuscript, before Harper & Row itself could publish the book.176 
In resolving the matter before the Court, in addition to making 
                                                 
protection under the Copyright Act of 1976 as compilations. Second, the article directly 
attacks various applications of the doctrine of “industrious collection” (or “sweat of the 
brow”), including in the telephone directory cases in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that 
preceded Feist. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 95, at 772 n.184, 773–77 (“D. Section 
103(b): Limitations on Copyright Protection for Compilations”). 
 171. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. 
 172. Id. But see Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright 
Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007). Indeed, although the seven-digit telephone 
numbers at issue in Feist were not created by Rural, the assignment of those numbers to 
particular individuals or households arguably was. 
 173. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. 
    174   The constitutional analysis in the Court’s opinion, as discussed above, is 
contained in Part II.A. 
 175. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 176. Id. at 542. 
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all of the constitutional points reiterated in Feist,177 Justice 
O’Connor quietly dropped a seemingly off-point observation 
which, in retrospect, appears to be highly prescient: 
Perhaps the controversy between the lower courts in this 
case over copyrightability is more aptly styled a dispute 
over whether The Nation’s appropriation of unoriginal and 
uncopyrightable elements encroached on the originality 
embodied in [A Time to Heal] as a whole. Especially in the 
realm of factual narrative, the law is currently unsettled 
regarding the ways in which uncopyrightable elements [can] 
combine with the author’s original contributions to form 
protected expression.178 
It took six more years, and a certiorari grant to consider an 
unpublished, two-paragraph decision by the Tenth Circuit,179 but 
the Justice finally found the case to decide that “unsettled” 
question. “Reach Out and Touch Someone,” indeed.180 
Regarding Feist’s reliance of secondary authority for its 
constitutional analysis, as to treatises there is no contest. 
Melville and David Nimmer’s Nimmer on Copyright, still hugely 
cited today, was even “bigger” in the federal court copyright 
                                                 
 177. Id. at 547 (“Creation of a nonfiction work, even a compilation of pure fact, 
entails originality.”). 
 178. Id. at 548 (emphasis added). 
 179. Only one paragraph of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion was substantive. It contained 
a brief statement of facts, and a string cite to prior directory cases holding such works 
copyrightable by virtue of industrious collection (or “sweat of the brow”). The opinion is 
reprinted in Appendix 3. 
 180. See supra note 4. See also Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 
1368 (5th Cir. 1981), cited by Justice O’Connor in Feist and in fact anticipating her point 
about the noncopyrightability of facts in factual compilations. Shortly after the grant of 
certiorari in Feist, a young law professor in Houston, Texas, wrote a brief piece 
pinpointing what was at stake in the Court’s impending decision: 
  The Supreme Court now has the attention not only of the copyright bar 
throughout the country, but of all the copyright industries which, in small or 
large part, have relied upon their labor—or “sweat of the brow”—to justify the 
copyright monopoly which the Constitution permits Congress to secure only to 
“Authors.” The Supreme Court has an historic opportunity to set copyright law 
back on a proper footing in all of these industries. and in so doing to ensure 
that the rewards bestowed upon authors are again properly proportioned to 
the original contributions such persons make to the common weal. 
  Should the Court hang up on copyright for “white pages” directories? As Cliff 
Robertson likes to say in the current AT&T commercials: it’s “The Right 
Choice.” 
Craig Joyce, “Reach Out and Touch Someone”: Should the Supreme Court Hang Up on 
Copyright Protection for “White Pages” Directories?, 10 U. HOUS. L. CTR BRIEFCASE, Issue 
No. 2. at 6 (1991). 
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opinions of the 1980s and 1990s.181 With respect to articles 
concerning copyrightability, this section of Feist cites to a 
veritable “Who’s Who” of scholars, including Robert C. 
Denicola,182 Jane C. Ginsburg,183 Craig Joyce,184 William F. 
Patry,185 and L. Ray Patterson.186 It would be a difficult 
undertaking (and unwise) to attempt to sort out the relative 
influences of the various contributions to the literature.187 
2. The Statutory Issue 
a. Analyzing the Opinion.  With her constitutional analysis 
as a predicate, Justice O’Connor next addressed the statutory 
question on which the Court, in fact, had granted certiorari.188 In 
effect, the opinion construed the statutory provision, and 
answered the question presented, through its just-established 
constitutional prism. 
In the immediate aftermath of the opinion in Feist, some 
scholars expressed surprise at this approach. Marci A. Hamilton, 
for example, wrote: 
                                                 
 181. According to Westlaw, the Supreme Court cited the Nimmer treatise nine times 
in the two decades before 2000 and six times since. Patry’s treatise (first published in 
1994) was cited twice in the 1990s and four times since. Goldstein’s treatise (first 
published in 1989) was cited twice in the 1990s and once since. For all courts, in the two 
decades before 2000, Nimmer was cited in 1,011 published opinions, Goldstein in 74, 
Patry in 34, and Abrams (first published in 1991) in 10. Since 2000, Nimmer has been 
cited in 944 published opinions, Patry in 113, Goldstein in 85, and Abrams in 12. 
 182. Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction 
Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981) (cited in Brief for the Respondent, 1990 WL 
513113, at *30 and Reply Brief for the Petitioner, 1990 WL 513114, at *12). 
 183. Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990). 
 184. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 95 (cited Brief for Petitioner, supra note 152, at 
*17, and Brief for the Respondent, supra note 182, at *34). 
 185. Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the “White Pages” Are Not 
Copyrightable), 12 COM. & LAW 37 (Dec. 1990) (cited in Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra 
note 182, at *3). 
 186. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 95. 
 187. Not that no one has tried. In Justice O’Connor’s Intellectual Property Opinions, 
Hamilton, supra note 158, Hamilton, herself a former law clerk to Justice O’Connor, 
asserts that the source of the Court’s “quite remarkable” and “pervasive” constitutional 
analysis “appears to be Professors Patterson’s and Joyce’s article on the scope of 
protection for compilations.” Id. at 74 & n.28. It should be noted, however, that Feist had 
specifically cited Nimmer, and that District Court had specifically rejected Nimmer’s 
approach. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. (Rural I), 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. 
Kan. 1987). In any event, Hamilton does offer what she perceives to be a fascinating 
contrast between the analytical approaches taken by Justice O’Connor in Harper & Row 
and Feist. Hamilton, Intellectual Property Opinions, supra note 158, at 72–76. 
 188. See notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
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  Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudential approach . . . is usually 
restrained. She generally refuses to reach for the broad 
holding when a more narrow and precise holding will do. 
The surprising quality of her Feist opinion lies in its sweep. 
. . . 
Given that the interpretation of the statute alone could 
have resolved the issues presented to the Court, that the 
question on which the Court granted certiorari was not cast 
in constitutional terms, and that the decision below was not 
based on constitutional grounds, the Court’s pervasive 
constitutional analysis is quite remarkable; it is especially 
arresting where the author of the opinion is Justice 
O’Connor.189 
Given, however, that O’Connor (and the Court) were 
deciding the scope of compilations under 17 U.S.C. § 103 
(“Subject matter of copyright: Compilations and derivative 
works”), that § 103 is conditioned by § 102 (“Subject matter of 
copyright: In general”) and § 101 (“Definition[]” of 
“compilations”), and that both §§ 102 and 101 require an 
“original work of authorship” for copyrightability, the 
methodology of the Feist opinion—twenty-five years in hindsight, 
at least—seems, at a minimum, highly defensible. 
Part II.B. of the opinion, after linking itself directly to Part 
II.A., declared that “[t]he Court’s decisions announcing [the 
constitutionally mandated requirement of originality for all 
works] predate[d] the Copyright Act of 1909,” but that ambiguous 
language in that Act “caused some lower courts temporarily to 
lose sight of this requirement”:190 
  Most courts construed the 1909 Act correctly . . . They 
understood from this Court’s decisions that there could be 
no copyright without originality. See Patterson & Joyce 
760–761. As explained in the Nimmer treatise: “The 1909 
                                                 
 189. Hamilton, Intellectual Property Opinions, supra note 158, at 73–74 (citations 
omitted). By way of contrast, on February 8, 1991, the day after Justice O’Connor 
circulated her first draft opinion, a clerk to Justice Blackmun sent his boss a 
memorandum to the following effect. Blackmun had voted in conference to affirm but had 
said to the clerk afterwards that he did not find his vote “satisfactory” (Blackmun’s term). 
“You then indicated that you might join an opinion reversing the court below if it were 
narrowly crafted to apply only to telephone books.” Analyzing the opinion received the day 
before from Justice O’Connor, the clerk found it “quite narrow” and of “limited scope” 
(referring to the “narrowness of the Court’s holding” as to the copyrightability of white 
pages without commenting on the breadth of the rest of the opinion). The clerk urged: 
“[U]nless you feel strongly that the Court’s determination is incorrect as applied to white 
pages listings, I recommend that you join SOC’s opinion . . .” Blackmun ultimately 
decided not to, concurring only in the judgment. See Blackmun Papers, supra note 3. 
 190. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991). 
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Act neither defined originality nor even expressly required 
that a work be ‘original’ in order to command protection. 
However, the courts uniformly inferred the requirement 
from the fact that copyright protection may only be claimed 
by ‘authors.’ . . . It was reasoned that, since an author is 
‘the . . . creator, originator,’ it follows that a work is not the 
product of an author unless the work is original.” Nimmer 
§ 2.01 (footnotes omitted) (citing cases). 
 But some courts misunderstood the statute. . . .191 
To illustrate how lower courts “temporarily” had lost sight of 
the Supreme Court’s 19th century precedents, the Feist Court 
cited two cases from the early 20th century: Leon v. Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.192 and Jeweler’s Circular Publishing 
Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.193 The choice of Leon as an 
example was no accident: Leon had served as the 
great-grandparent to a string of telephone white pages directory 
cases, all of which upheld copyright in such works, and had been 
featured in the string cite in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Feist. 
Leon, in turn, had relied on Jeweler’s Circular. These cases not 
only had strayed from the path of The Trade-Mark Cases and 
Burrow-Giles v. Sarony but, “[m]aking matters worse,” had 
“developed a new theory . . . known alternatively as ‘sweat of the 
brow’ or ‘industrious collection,’” to justify the collection of factual 
compilations.194 
Among the numerous flaws in such decisions, the Feist Court 
specified (consistent with its determination of the constitutional 
issues in the case) as “most glaring” that the “sweat of the brow” 
cases “extended copyright protection in a compilation . . . beyond 
the compilers original contributions [which, it had already noted, 
could extend only to the selection and arrangement of preexisting 
materials] to the facts themselves.”195 In short, and “[w]ithout a 
                                                 
 191. Id. at 351–52. 
 192. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); see supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
 193. 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922); see supra notes 67–76 and accompanying text. 
 194. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352. As noted earlier, supra text accompanying notes 82–94, 
“sweat of the brow” and “industrious collection” not only were not synonymous, but in fact 
had borne quite opposite meanings, for almost the entire history of the prior case law. 
They were, however, conflated in the Petitioner’s brief, Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 
152, at 19, which may explain why, in Feist, the Court seemed to regard the two terms as 
equivalent. 
 195. Feist, 499 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added). For good measure, Feist identified 
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981), as a recent lower 
court decision which had properly observed that distinction. Other cases noted for 
commendation: Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 
204 (2d Cir. 1986); Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 
501 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 
 
Joyce and Ochoa_EIC Edit Complete_McIntosh (Do Not Delete)  11/14/2016  6:17 PM 
140 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [54:2 
doubt,” the “sweat of the brow” doctrine “flouted basic copyright 
principles.”196 
Here, Justice O’Connor’s opinion has been criticized for 
ignoring the 19th-century cases that had espoused the “labor” 
theory of copyright (albeit without the labels “industrious 
collection” or “sweat of the brow”).197 Those decisions had been 
implicitly overruled by The Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles; 
but the earlier cases had been decided by Supreme Court 
justices, riding circuit; and the Court’s own opinion in Bleistein, 
an early 20th-century case, had been partially responsible for 
reviving them.198 Leaving them out of the Feist opinion 
strengthened the opinion rhetorically, but it does leave readers 
with a somewhat less-than-full view of the complexity of 
copyright history. 
Part II.C. of O’Connor’s opinion banished the “sweat of the 
brow” doctrine, applied both in cases (like Jeweler’s Circular) 
decided under the 1909 Act and in those (like the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in Feist) decided under its successor,199 and replaced it 
with doctrine squarely based on the language of the 1976 Act 
regarding compilations. 
The opinion gave due credit to the Copyright Office and to 
Congress for deciding early in the drafting of the Copyright Act of 
1976 to “overhaul the copyright statute generally” and to “clear 
up the confusion in the lower courts as to the basic standard of 
                                                 
F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 
(2d Cir. 1966); see supra notes 98–11 and accompanying text. Oddly, the Court also cited 
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), which is perhaps best 
regarded as a “copyright case without a copyright,” for the proposition that facts could not 
be copyrighted. Feist, 499 U.S. at 353–54 & n*. In creating the common-law doctrine of 
misappropriation, however, INS had done more to advance the “labor” theory of copyright 
than any other case in the 20th century, and had, in fact, been cited for support in 
Jeweler’s Circular. See supra notes 62–76 and accompanying text. 
 196. Feist, 499 U.S. at 354 (citing Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 563 (1985)), and Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy: The Implications for 
Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 560 (1982). 
 197. Marci Hamilton observed, shortly after the opinion in Feist was handed down, 
that “[t]he Court stretche[d] to make this point despite a rather impressive historical 
basis for courts’ use of ‘sweat of the brow’ as a justification for copyright protection.” 
Hamilton, Intellectual Property Opinions, supra note 158, at 74; see also Jane C. 
Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist 
v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 339–41 (1992); cf. Ginsburg, Creation and 
Commercial Value, supra note 20, at 1875–81 (discussing the history in more detail). 
 198. See supra notes 40–61 and accompanying text. 
 199. Feist, 499 U.S. at 359–60 (“[T]he 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no 
doubt that originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of copyright protection in 
directories and other fact-based works. Nor is there any doubt that the same was true 
under the 1909 Act.”) (emphasis added). 
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copyrightability.”200 The Register of Copyrights had explained in 
his first report to Congress that “originality” was a “basic 
requisit[e] of copyright under the 1909 Act,” but that the absence 
of any reference to originality in the 1909 Act “seems to have led 
to misconceptions as to what is copyrightable matter.” The 
Register had suggested making the originality requirement 
explicit, and Congress had taken the Register’s advice.201 
In making explicit the originality requirement, however, 
Congress announced that it was merely clarifying existing law: 
The two fundamental criteria of copyright protection [are] 
originality and fixation in tangible form. . . . The phrase 
“original works of authorship,” which is purposely left 
undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the 
standard of originality established by the courts under the 
present [1909] copyright statute.202 
Thus, the Court in Feist found itself faced with the task (in a 
compilations case but with ramifications throughout all of 
copyrightability law) of setting parameters for the meaning of a 
term, “originality,” which Congress itself had chosen deliberately 
not to define. 
With respect to identifying the originality protected in 
compilations, Congress, besides cleaning up 1909 Act 
ambiguities, took two critical steps in enacting the 1976 Act. 
First, it specifically included compilations as copyrightable 
subject matter in § 103. Second, it defined the term 
“compilations” in § 101. 
Section 103(a) explains that “[t]he subject matter of 
copyright . . . includes compilations,”203 but also, in § 103(b), that 
                                                 
 200. Id. at 354–55. 
 201. Id. at 355 (citing Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of 
the U.S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1961)). 
 202. Id. at 355 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 50 
(1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664) (emphasis added by Authors; 
emphasis by Feist Court omitted). The Court’s emphasis highlighted the “without change” 
language of the Congressional documents, but those documents manifestly left unclear 
which courts had established the standards Congress meant to incorporate “without 
change.” The Supreme Court had not itself spoken on the question of originality since 
before the 1909 Act had been enacted, other than the tangential reference in International 
News Service v. Associated Press. 
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). The term “subject matter of copyright” refers back to § 102 
(“Subject matter of copyright: In general”). Section 102(a) lays out eight types of works of 
authorship: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;  
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and 
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. Thus, 
compilations may take the form, for example, of “literary works,” which are defined in 
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copyright protects only the author’s original contributions—not 
the facts or information conveyed: 
  The copyright in a compilation . . . extends only to the 
material contributed by the author of such work, as 
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in 
the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the 
preexisting material.204 
Thus, even if a work qualifies as a copyrightable 
compilation, it receives only limited protection under § 103 of the 
Act: a compilation author may not keep others from using the 
facts or data he or she has collected. 
But what is a compilation? Section 101 defines a 
“compilation,” with emphasis by the Feist Court, as follows: “a 
work formed by the collection and assembly of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in 
such a way that the resulting work, as a whole, constitutes an 
original work of authorship.”205 
The reason for the Court’s rendition of the statute as shown 
above becomes clear when the opinion declares, immediately 
afterwards, that its emphases reveal the definition’s purpose—to 
make clear that collections of facts are “not copyrightable per 
se”—by emphasizing “its tripartite structure.”206 Read properly, 
then: 
  The purpose of the statutory definition is to emphasize 
that collections of facts are not copyrightable per se. It 
conveys this message through its tripartite structure, as 
emphasized above by the italics. The statute identifies 
three distinct elements, and requires each to be met for a 
work to qualify as a copyrightable compilation: (1) the 
collection and assembly of preexisting material, facts, or 
                                                 
§ 101 as “works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other 
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, 
such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in 
which they are embodied.” Notably for the future, although not for Feist itself, this rubric 
is broad enough to comprehend not only white pages telephone directories but also 
computer databases. Section 102(b) identifies specifically those elements of a work for 
which copyright is not available: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 356, citing, again, Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985), notes that § 102(b) 
“is universally understood to prohibit any copyright in facts.” 
 204. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). 
 205. Feist, 499 U.S. at 356 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “compilation”)) 
(emphasis added by the Court). 
 206. Feist, 499 U.S. at 357. 
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data; (2) the selection, coordination, or arrangement of 
those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the 
particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an 
“original” work of authorship. “[T]his tripartite conjunctive 
structure is self-evident, and should be assumed to 
accurately express the legislative purpose.” [William F.] 
Patry[, Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the 
“White Pages” Are Not Copyrightable), 12 Com. & Law 37,] 
51 [(Dec.1990)], quoting Mills Music[, Inc. v. Snyder], 469 
U. S. [153,] 164 [(1985)].207 
The opinion next proceeds to consider, individually, the 
elements of the tripartite structure. The first element is 
important because, apart from describing what one normally 
thinks of as a compilation, namely, a collection of pre-existing 
material, facts, or data, the integration of this element into the 
larger structure of the definition makes clear that the first 
requirement “is not the sole requirement. To satisfy the statutory 
definition, [a compilation] must get over two additional 
hurdles.”208 
The third element “emphasizes that a compilation, like any 
other work, is copyrightable only if it satisfies the originality 
requirement (‘an original work of authorship’).”209 According to 
Justice O’Connor, although § 102 states plainly that originality 
as a constitutional prerequisite applies to all works, Congress in 
its § 101 definition of compilations emphasized that requirement 
again, “to ensure that courts would not repeat the mistake of the 
‘sweat of the brow’ courts by concluding that fact-based works are 
treated differently . . .”210 
The “key” to the statutory definition, however, is its second 
element. It requires that, in determining whether a fact-based 
                                                 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. Underlying the ultimate opinion in the case were several critical “sweat of 
the brow” colloquies during oral argument. For example: 
QUESTION [by Justice Souter]: . . . [T]he copyright in a compilation . . . extends 
only to the material contributed by the author. And my suggestion is that 
[§ 103(b)] implies something about the content of the work rather than 
something about the effort that goes into producing the work. My question 
is . . . what is the material in your directory that is contributed by the author? 
MR. CAPLINGER: Okay, Justice Souter, to answer that question is that the—
again, the bits of factual information alone are not copyrightable. What the 
contribution is of the author in the form of collective work of a compilation is the 
hard work or labor as you put it. . . . 
QUESTION: That’s effort. . . . 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 156, at 52. 
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work is an original work of authorship, courts should focus “on 
the manner in which the collected facts have been selected, 
coordinated, and arranged.”211 Returning to the primary theme 
from Part II.A. of its opinion, the Court described the second 
element of the statutory definition as “a straightforward 
application of the originality requirement.”212 Because “[f]acts are 
never original,” a compilation author “can claim originality, if at 
all, only in the way the facts are presented.”213 And to that end, 
the statute dictates “that the principal focus should be on 
whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are 
sufficiently original to merit protection.”214 
What is clear from the statutory definition of compilations, 
therefore, is that “[n]ot every selection, coordination, or 
arrangement will pass muster.”215 From this, and “in accordance 
with the established principle that a court should give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute,”216 the Court 
determined that the statute to be applied to the facts of the case 
at hand “envisions that there will be some fact-based works in 
which the selection, coordination, and arrangement are not 
sufficiently original to trigger copyright protection.”217 
In summary, the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act of 1909 
“leave no doubt that originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the 
touchstone of copyright protection” in directories and other 
fact-based works.218 
All that remained was to dispose of the case at bar. 
b. Sources of the Statutory Analysis.219  Feist’s statutory 
analysis, like its constitutional analysis, relies principally on 
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises220 and Miller v. Universal 
City Studios,221 together with reinvocations of The Trade-Mark 
                                                 
 211. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “compilation”)). 
 212. Id. at 358 (emphasis added). 
 213. Id. (emphasis added). 
 214. Id. at 358 (emphasis added). 
 215. Id. (emphasis added). 
 216. Id. (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990), for the 
“established principle” stated). 
 217. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added). 
 218. Id. at 359–60. 
 219. The statutory analysis in the Court’s opinion, as discussed above, is contained in 
Parts II.B. and II.C. 
 220. See supra note 175. 
 221. See supra note 103. 
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Cases222 and Burrow-Giles v. Sarony,223 plus a solitary reference 
to Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing.224 
As to Feist’s reliance of secondary authority for its statutory 
analysis, Nimmer on Copyright remains not just king of the hill 
but also the only occupant of the hill. With respect to articles 
concerning compilations in history and as defined by the 1976 
Act, all of the scholars represented in Part II.A. on constitutional 
analysis reappear, along with Robert A. Gorman.225 In the 
Court’s statutory analysis, however, clearly the lead authority is 
William F. Patry.226 His argument that the “tripartite conjunctive 
structure” of the § 101 definition of “compilations” is 
“self-evident, and should be assumed to ‘accurately express the 
legislative purpose,’” is without doubt the scholarly lynchpin of 
the Court’s approach to the statute.227 
3. Deciding the Case 
Part III of the Feist opinion resolves, in the context of 
copyright for factual compilations, the “undeniable tension” 
described by Justice O’Connor at the outset of Part II. 
In taking 1,309 names, towns, and telephone numbers from 
Rural’s white pages, did Feist copy anything that was “original” 
to Rural and protected by copyright law? The answer is no. “The 
originality requirement ‘rule[s] out protecting . . . names, 
                                                 
 222. See supra note 25. 
 223. See supra note 32. 
 224. See supra note 40; see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
358–59 (1991) (“Presumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass [the ‘minimal 
level of creativity’] test, but not all will. There remains a narrow category of works in 
which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. See 
generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (referring to 
‘the narrowest and most obvious limits’). Such works are incapable of sustaining a valid 
copyright.”). 
 225. Fact or Fancy?: The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
560 (1982) (cited in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 152). 
 226. Patry, supra note 185. Interestingly but understandably, only the Reply Brief 
for Petitioner discussed this particular scholarly authority, which was published in 
December 1990, late in the process of filing the briefs. 
 227. Patry, supra note 185, at 51. Marci Hamilton suggests that “[t]he Court’s 
confident conclusion that industrious collection should never be a basis for copyright 
protection . . . appears to rely especially on [Patterson & Joyce].” See Hamilton, 
Intellectual Property Opinions, supra note 158, at 74 n.33. The reality, however that may 
be, is that slaying the “sweat of the brow” dragon for copyright in compilation protection 
is the destructive work of Feist. Establishing a viable alternative thereto, based on the 
relevant portions of the Copyright Act of 1976, is the major constructive work of Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion. That lasting accomplishment of Feist rests squarely on the analytical 
approach to the statute offered by Patry, then a policy planning advisor to the Register of 
Copyrights. 
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addresses, and telephone numbers of which the plaintiff, by no 
stretch of the imagination, could be called the author.’”228 
Still, under the Court’s construction of the relevant 
provisions of the 1976 Act, a second question remained: Did 
Rural achieve a modicum of protection, which Feist infringed, by 
selecting, coordinating, or arranging uncopyrightable facts in an 
original way? Again, the answer is no. “The standard of 
originality is low, but it does exist.”229 Rural’s selection of 
preexisting material, which in no way could be deemed authored, 
was “mechanical,” “routine,” and “entirely typical” of all 
telephone directory white pages.230 Its arrangement, in 
alphabetical order by last name, contained “nothing remotely 
creative,” and was “not only unoriginal” but “practically 
inevitable.”231 
Thus, Rural did not have a valid copyright in the materials 
copied by Feist,232 and hence it had suffered no infringement. 
                                                 
 228. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361 (citing Patterson & Joyce, supra note 95, at 776). 
 229. Id. at 362 (citing Patterson & Joyce, supra note 95, at 760 n.144). 
 230. Id. Moreover, as the Court noted, Rural was required to publish a directory 
containing all of the subscribers in its area by the Kansas Corporation Commission. Id. at 
363. Thus, the selection did not even owe its origin to Rural, without regard to the 
“minimal amount of creativity” needed. 
 231. Id. at 363. The matter of the purported originality of “arrangement, in 
alphabetical order by last name,” and related matters, occasioned no little hilarity at oral 
argument: 
QUESTION [by Justice Kennedy]: If we can assume, and I think it’s true, that 
the name and the address and the number are a fact that’s not 
copyrightable . . . what elements of originality have you added to those facts that 
make this a work of original authorship under 101? . . . You’ve alphabetized, 
which I think we could talk about, but I don’t think that’s very original. What 
else? . . . 
MR. CAPLINGER: . . . We also decide what name, because my full name might 
be a fact. But I go by several names, James, Jim, Jay, JR, et cetera. And— 
QUESTION: I’m not stunned by the originality so far. (Laughter.) . . . 
MR. CAPLINGER: . . . All directories, and the encyclopedia included, are a 
compilation. That’s what a compilation is. These are books of facts. What makes 
them original is how the author arranges that information . . . He gathers all 
this factual information. But if he doesn’t then somehow make a decision on how 
to put that in a compilation, it’s not—it’s not a useable compilation. . . . 
QUESTION [by Justice Scalia]: He has to say, ah-hah, I am going to put this in 
there alphabetically. (Laughter.) 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 156, at 33–36. 
 232. At the outset of Part III in her second, penultimate draft opinion on February 
15, O’Connor observed that, in order to establish infringement, a plaintiff must establish 
two points: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copyright of constituent elements of 
the work that are original. Point 1, she noted, was “not at issue here” because Feist had 
conceded that Rural’s directory, “considered as a whole,” was copyrightable “because it 
contains [in addition to the white pages] some foreword text, as well as original material 
in the yellow pages advertisements.” The draft then proceeded to point 2. On March 22, 
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Bringing together the two parts of the opinion (constitutional and 
statutory), Justice O’Connor determined that: 
[A]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those 
constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de 
minimis quantum of creativity. Rural’s white pages, limited 
to basic subscriber information and arranged 
alphabetically, fall short of the mark. As a statutory matter, 
17 U.S.C. § 101 does not afford protection from copying to a 
collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and 
arranged in a way that utterly lacks originality.233 
In an observation doubtless of little consolation to Rural (or 
other claimants in thin or nonexistent compilation copyrights), 
Feist concluded: “This decision should not be construed as 
demeaning Rural’s efforts in compiling its directory, but rather 
as making clear that copyright rewards originality, not effort.”234 
Why? Because the Constitution and the statute so required. 
IV. AFTER FEIST 
A. Feist’s Impact on Directories and Databases235 
On the Monday following the Feist decision, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Illinois Bell, another directory case, 
vacated the decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Feist.236 On remand, the Seventh Circuit held that Feist 
                                                 
Justice Scalia requested a clarification regarding point 1 and the draft’s “We conclude” 
paragraph, which led with a statement that the Court had determined that Rural’s white 
pages were “incapable of sustaining a valid copyright” without reiterating Rural’s 
entitlement to copyright on the directory as a whole. As a result, O’Connor revised the 
paragraph in question in her third and final draft. The new language made clear that “the 
names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and 
therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural’s combined white and yellow pages 
directory.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 365 (emphasis added). Scalia then joined the opinion. 
O’Connor noted to the Chief Justice that the case was now ready for announcement, and 
Rehnquist promptly calendared its release for March 27, 1991. Blackmun Papers, supra 
note 3. 
 233. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363–64 (emphasis added). 
 234. Id. at 364. 
 235. Feist is unquestionably one of the Court’s landmark decisions on copyright. A 
full examination of its effect on the law of originality, and on the law of compilations in 
particular, would fill another article. For brevity’s sake, we focus here on only one aspect 
of Feist’s legacy: its impact on directories and databases. 
 236. See Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. 
granted, decision vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 499 U.S. 944 (1991). Justice 
Stevens had urged the Court to grant certiorari in Illinois Bell rather than in Feist. See 
supra note 3. On March 25, 1991, two days before Feist’s announcement by the Court, 
Justice O’Connor wrote a memorandum to her colleagues: 
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“forecloses Illinois Bell’s legal argument,” and it remanded the 
case to the District Court “for the entry of judgment in favor of 
Haines on Illinois Bell’s copyright claims.”237 
After Feist and Illinois Bell were decided, database providers 
and some commentators complained that the Court had “stripped 
away or sharply reduced the copyright protection afforded a 
variety of ‘information products,’ from directories and mailing 
lists to computerized databases.”238 Moreover, the prospects for 
state-law protection were dubious, notwithstanding the 
persistence in some states of a “misappropriation” doctrine based 
on International News Service v. Associated Press,239 because of 
the express preemption clause in the 1976 Act.240 Thus, many 
database providers began lobbying for a federal statute against 
copying factual information from databases. Indeed, in the dozen 
years after Feist, multiple bills were introduced in Congress to 
protect database providers against unauthorized uses of data 
they had compiled.241 But because the Court in Feist had declared 
that “[o]riginality is a Constitutional requirement” under the 
Copyright Clause,242 these bills triggered fierce debate over 
whether Congress could enact “database protection” under some 
other power, such as the Interstate Commerce Clause.243 
                                                 
[Illinois Bell] was held pending our decision in Feist. . . . In Feist, we reject 
the ‘sweat of the brow’ approach and hold that a typical white pages 
directory lacks the modicum of originality required for copyright protection. 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision [in Illinois Bell] is inconsistent with our 
holding. Accordingly, I will vote to GVR [grant, vacate, and remand] in light 
of Feist. 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 3. 
 237. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 932 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 238. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”?, supra note 197, at 339. 
 239. Id. at 354–55; see also Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years 
Old: Should We Bury It or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781 (1994); Gary Myers, The 
Restatement’s Rejection of the Misappropriation Tort: A Victory for the Public Domain, 47 
S.C. L. REV. 673 (1996); Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 
621, 641 (2003) (“Clarity of analysis would be enhanced if the doctrine and the very word 
were banished from discussions of intellectual property law.”). 
 240. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); see Ginsburg, No “Sweat”?, supra note 197, at 355–61 
(analyzing the question); Patterson & Joyce, supra note 95, at 777–81 (ditto). 
 241. See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 
3261, 108th Cong. (2003); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th 
Cong. (1999); Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. 
(1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997); 
Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th 
Cong. (1996). 
 242. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 243. For a flavor of the debate, see Ginsburg, No “Sweat”?, supra note 197, at 367–
74; Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
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But a funny thing happened to the federal database bills 
proposed in the wake of Feist: they failed to secure a majority in 
Congress. The bills were opposed by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and by a number of database providers, including 
AT&T, Yahoo!, Bloomberg, and Charles Schwab.244 It appears 
that many databases meet the “minimal degree of creativity” 
standard announced in Feist, and/or that many database 
providers successfully use contract law to restrict competitors’ 
access to and use of their data, thus rendering sui generis 
database protection unnecessary. No doubt, also, many would-be 
publishers find it more convenient to license data in a 
computer-ready format than to copy it from a published source. 
Finally, if measured empirically, Feist seems to have served the 
Copyright and Patent Clause’s constitutional purpose, “to 
promote the Progress of Science,” by encouraging competition in 
the market for databases: 
Between 1991, the year Feist was decided, and 1997, the 
number of databases increased from 7,637 to 10,338—an 
increase of thirty-five percent. The number of files 
contained in these databases increased from 4 billion to 
11.2 billion—an increase of 180%. There are, therefore, 
more and bigger databases seven years after Feist.245 
By contrast, the European Union, not bound by the Feist 
case, did adopt a sui generis right in its 1996 Database 
Directive.246 Article 7(1) of the Directive gives the owner of a 
database the right “to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of 
the whole or of a substantial part . . . of the contents of that 
database,” but only if there has been “a substantial investment in 
either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents” 
of the database.247 The European Court of Justice has interpreted 
the “substantial investment” clause narrowly, so that it does not 
apply to the investment involved in creating the data initially, 
                                                 
1119; Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of Databases Can Be 
Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159 (2002); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: 
Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual 
Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999). 
 244. Joseph A. Loy, Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act of 
2003: Unconstitutionally Expanding Copyright Law?, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 
458 (2004). 
 245. William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An 
Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 386–87 (1999). 
 246. Directive 96/9/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20 (EC). 
 247. Id. Art. 7(1). 
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only in obtaining it.248 The EU had hoped that the Directive 
would “stimulate the production of databases in Europe”;249 but a 
study nine years later concluded that the Directive “has had no 
proven impact on the production of databases.”250 Indeed, four 
years after the Directive was implemented in 2001, the U.S. 
share of the worldwide database market increased from 60% to 
72%, while the European share of the market fell from 34% to 
24%.251 The report concluded that “[w]ith respect to ‘non-original’ 
databases, the assumption that more and more layers of IP 
protection means more innovation and growth appears not to 
hold up.”252 
One example will suffice to demonstrate the effect of Feist on 
competition in databases: star pagination. Before Feist was 
decided, West Publishing had sued its primary competitor in the 
online database market, Mead Data Central (providers of 
LEXIS), over Mead’s practice of indicating in its online reports 
the page numbers in West’s bound volumes of judicial reports.253 
A majority of the Eighth Circuit panel relied in part on the 
“industrious collection” doctrine in affirming the lower court’s 
preliminary injunction in favor of West, stating: “[A]ccess to 
these particular numbers—the ‘jump cites’—would give users of 
LEXIS a large part of what West has spent so much labor and 
industry in compiling.”254 The Supreme Court denied certiorari,255 
and the parties settled the lawsuit (with Lexis reportedly paying 
West “tens of millions of dollars”) before there was a final ruling 
on the merits.256 The decision likely deterred competitors from 
entering the market for computer-aided legal research, because 
                                                 
 248. Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Bd. v. William Hill Org.,1 C.M.L.R. 15, 
¶¶ 40–42 (2005). 
 249. Commission of the European Communities, DG Internal Market and Services 
Working Paper, First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of 
Databases, at 20 (2005), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/ 
evaluation_report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZGH-5VDE]. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 22–23. 
 252. Id. at 24. 
 253. West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 254. Id. at 1227; see also id. at 1228 (citing Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer [sic] 
Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985)). See generally Patterson & Joyce, supra note 
95 (criticizing the decision). 
 255. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co., 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). 
 256. Stephen Labaton, Westlaw and Lexis Near Truce, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1988, at 
D5. 
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many courts require citations to the page numbers in the official 
reporters (published by West) when filing briefs in court.257 
After Feist, two competitors to West, Matthew Bender and 
Hyperlaw, sought a declaratory judgment that “star pagination” 
was not protected by West’s copyright in its published volumes, 
so that they could indicate page breaks when publishing 
compilations of judicial opinions on CD-ROM.258 The Second 
Circuit noted that “West concedes that the pagination of its 
volumes . . . is determined by an automatic computer program, 
and West does not seriously claim that there is anything original 
or creative in that process.”259 As a result, it disagreed with the 
Eighth Circuit and affirmed the District Court’s ruling that “star 
pagination” did not infringe: 
  At bottom, West Publishing Co. rests upon the now 
defunct “sweat of the brow” doctrine. . . . [T]he Eighth 
Circuit in West Publishing Co. erroneously protected West’s 
industrious collection rather than its original creation. 
Because Feist undermines the reasoning of West Publishing 
Co., . . . we decline to follow it.260 
In a companion case,261 the Second Circuit also held that 
West’s “enhancements” to the judicial opinions (putting the 
caption into a standard format, and adding names of counsel, 
subsequent history, and parallel citations) were “lacking even 
minimal creativity” and were also not protected under Feist.262 In 
other words, only the syllabus, headnotes, and West’s key 
numbers were copyrightable,263 so that a competitor could copy 
                                                 
 257. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 95 at 726–27 (stating “the result in West 
Publishing in theory gives one publisher veto power over whether the profession, and thus 
the public, shall enjoy the full benefits of enhanced access to law which computer-assisted 
legal research offers”) & 726–27 n.21 (documenting the jurisdictions in which citation to a 
West Reporter is required). 
 258. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Specifically, Matthew Bender filed suit, and Hyperlaw intervened as a plaintiff. Id. at 
698. 
 259. Id. at 699. 
 260. Id. at 708. The ruling was 2-1, with Judge Sweet, a district judge sitting by 
designation, dissenting. Id. 
 261. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Although Matthew Bender remained on the caption, only Hyperlaw sought to copy this 
information and defended the case on appeal. 
 262. Id. at 677. The court also noted that the choices West made were “obvious,” id., 
which, unfortunately, tends to suggest the patent standard of “non-obviousness.” See 35 
U.S.C. § 103. The court was on firmer ground when it quoted from Feist in finding West’s 
choices “typical,” id. at 677, and “garden variety,” id. at 682–83. 
 263. Id. at 676–77; see also id. at 688 (“West’s overall decision to add attorney 
information, subsequent history, and additional citation information exhibits little, if any, 
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the judicial opinions from West’s bound volumes (or from 
Westlaw), strip out the protected features, and use the edited 
opinions to compete with West, without infringing West’s 
copyright in its bound volumes.264 The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in both cases.265 
B. Feist’s Place in Copyright History 
Twenty-five years after it was handed down, few 
commentators would gainsay the proposition that Feist v. Rural 
is “deservedly famous”266 (although some have suggested that its 
legacy should be made more precise while others have decried its 
influence as “far from benign”).267 One might go further. At least 
arguably, Feist is the most important copyright decision of the 
20th century, certainly from the Supreme Court of the United 
States—which is, after all, supreme. 
There are, of course, other worthy candidates for that 
distinction. Taking them chronologically, one might begin with 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,268 decided in 1903 and, 
like Feist, a decision concerning authorship. But, while adopting 
a notably low threshold for protection, in his opinion for the 
Court majority in Bleistein Justice Holmes, himself a discerning 
connoisseur of the arts,269 seems to have been less concerned with 
the parameters of authorship and copyrightability generally270 
                                                 
creative insight; most courts already provide attorney information, and opinion accuracy 
mandates inclusion of subsequent history.”). 
 264. Id. at 677 (HyperLaw sought “a judgment declaring that the individual West 
case reports that are left after redaction of the first category of alterations (i.e., the 
independently composed features), do not contain copyrightable material”) (emphasis 
added). 
 265. West Publ’g Co. v. HyperLaw, Inc., 526 U.S. 1154 (1999) (enhancements); West 
Publ’g Co. v. Matthew Bender & Co., 526 U.S. 1154 (1999) (star pagination). 
 266. See generally William W. Fisher III, Recalibrating Originality, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 
(2016). (((EIC: Please update pagination))) 
 267. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Functional Compilations, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 
(2016); Molly Van Houweling, Authors Versus Owners, 54 HOUS. L. REV. (2016); Bleistein 
Story, supra note 40.(((EIC: Please update pagination))) 
 268. 188 U.S. 239 (1903); see supra notes 40–59 and accompanying text. 
 269. See Bleistein Story, supra note 40, at 94–100. 
 270. To the contrary regarding the focus and impact of the case, see Bleistein Story, 
supra note 40. Zimmerman notes that: 
[l]ower court judges both understood the case as setting the threshold for 
copyrightability at a very low level, and appreciated the pragmatic virtues 
of this approach. . . . [W]ithin thirty years, an appellate court could list 
dozens of decisions and cite to major treatises all agreeing that Bleistein 
required only ‘a low degree of originality and artistic or literary merit’ to 
obtain copyright. 
 
Joyce and Ochoa_EIC Edit Complete_McIntosh (Do Not Delete)  11/14/2016  6:17 PM 
2016] REACH OUT AND TOUCH SOMEONE 153 
than with what has been called the principle of “aesthetic 
non-discrimination.”271 That principle posits that, in evaluating 
issues of copyrightability, judges must avoid taking into account 
their own judgments as to the aesthetic quality of the works 
under consideration.272 Quite apart from that assessment of the 
hierarchy of Bleistein’s concerns, if the decision was primarily 
about authorship generally, it has effectively been overruled by 
Feist, the Court’s most recent pronouncement on the subject. 
Other possible candidates for “most important copyright 
decisions of the century” have their own problems. Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. v. Straus,273 decided in 1908, established the first-sale 
doctrine in copyright law; but it was superseded by the statutory 
codifications of that doctrine in the 1909 Act274 and the 1976 
Act,275 the latter being sufficiently unclear that it has required 
two Supreme Court opinions (and an unsuccessful attempt) to 
determine its meaning.276 International News Service v. 
Associated Press,277 decided in 1918, involved copyright only 
tangentially, and the common-law doctrine that it announced not 
only had no limiting principle and was often ignored by lower 
courts278 but, for good measure, was abrogated (along with all 
other general federal common law) by the 1938 decision in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tomkins.279 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark 
& Sons,280 a 1943 decision, affected the ownership of literally 
thousands of renewal copyrights, but it was probably wrongly 
                                                 
Bleistein Story, supra note 40, at 101–02 (citing Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical 
Co., 61 F.2d 131, 136 (8th Cir. 1932)). 
 271. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 272. “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside the 
narrowest and most obviously limits.” Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. 
 273. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 274. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084. 
 275. 17 U.S.C. § 109. 
 276. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Quality King 
Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998); Omega S.A. v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 562 U.S. 
40 (2010). 
 277. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 278. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. 
Hand, J.) (“[T]here are cases where the occasion is at once the justification for, and the 
limit of, what is decided. [INS] appears to us such an instance. . . . The difficulties of 
understanding it otherwise are insuperable.”); see also Baird, supra note 62, at 32–34. 
 279. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 280. 318 U.S. 643 (1943). 
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decided as a matter of Congressional intent.281 Mazer v. Stein282 
was a valiant 1954 attempt to deal with the problem of 
protectibility for expressive aspects of useful articles, but it was 
thoroughly displaced by the 1976 Act and its legislative 
history.283 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc.,284 a 1984 decision, and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises,285 decided the following year, had fascinating 
things to say about competition policy and fair use, but both 
required correction by a subsequent pronouncement of the Court, 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,286 within a decade. Campbell 
itself, handed down in 1994, has been called “the rescue of fair 
use”287 and might be the only other plausible candidate for “case 
of the century” celebration.288 
Feist is a towering decision, in all of U.S. copyright history 
(not just the 100 years from 1901 to 2000, in quite another way. 
The three most difficult-to-construe copyright-related terms in 
the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution289 are 
“Authors,” “Writings,” and “limited Times.” In the 19th century, 
in Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony,290 the Supreme 
Court declined to place any limitations on what might or might 
not constitute a “Writing” within the language adopted by the 
Framers.291 Burrow-Giles thus left U.S. copyright law open to the 
recognition of any non-de minimis expression (other than one 
                                                 
 281. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 2:41, 3 PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 7:12 (2016 ed.). 
 282. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 283. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”); H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54–55 (1976). The Supreme Court will consider a circuit split 
involving this statutory section in the October 2016 Term. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star 
Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016). 
 284. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 285. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 286. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 287. Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19 (1994); Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1449 (1997). 
 288. See Pierre N. Leval, Campbell as Fair Use Blueprint?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 597, 
597 (2015) (“I submit Campbell is a beautifully reasoned opinion, which has demonstrated 
in its twenty-one years that it provides a healthy framework for fair use analysis.”). 
 289. Again, for easy reference: “The Congress shall have Power To . . . promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 290. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 291. Id. at 58 (“Writings” include “all forms of writing, printing, engravings, 
etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression.”). 
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made orally and not recorded in any manner) as a “Writing.”292 
Similarly, in the 21st century, Justice Ginsburg for a Court 
majority in Eldred v. Ashcroft,293 in passing on the 
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998,294 declined to place any restraints on how 
long a term the IP clause might permit under the Framers’ rubric 
“limited Times,”295 thus arguably allowing, by virtue of future 
Congressional accretion, the creation of “perpetual copyright on 
the installment plan.”296 In short, as to two of the three key terms 
in the Clause, the Court in its critical decisions has made no 
serious attempt to set parameters. 
This history makes all the more remarkable the fact that 
Feist, Justice O’Connor’s “deservedly famous” 20th-century 
opinion, not only explicates key statutory terms such as 
“original” and “compilation” but also insists repeatedly that 
“[o]riginality is a Constitutional requirement” inherent in the 
terms “Authors” and their “Writings.”297 The opinion is broad, 
particularly for Justice O’Connor, but apparently, in her view 
and the view of a unanimous Court, for good cause shown. Is it 
an opinion beyond criticism? Certainly not. But surely it is 
among the greatest opinions in all of U.S. copyright history. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Twenty-five years have passed since the opinion in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. was handed 
down. What has changed since? 
In the law itself, Feist dominates any discussion of the law of 
originality generally, and the law of compilations in particular.298 
Feist was decided by a unanimous Supreme Court, remains 
unchallenged (not surprisingly) in the lower courts or by the 
Court itself, and is, for the reasons stated, a landmark in the 
history of the American law of copyright. 
                                                 
 292. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“Writings” include “any 
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”). 
 293. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 294. Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2817. 
 295. 537 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Fairly read, the Court has stated that 
Congress’ actions under the Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intents and purposes, 
judicially unreviewable.”). 
 296. Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 303 (1996). 
 297. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 298. According to Westlaw, Feist has been cited in over a thousand decisions in the 
25 years since it was decided. (Search performed Oct. 10, 2016). 
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What of the members of the Court that decided Feist? Among 
the Justices who participated in the decision, Justice O’Connor, 
the author of the opinion, is retired but has not resigned 
(meaning that she is no longer a member of the Supreme Court 
itself but remains eligible to serve by designation as a judge of a 
U.S. Court of Appeals or a District Court). Justices Stevens and 
Souter also are retired, while Justices Rehnquist, White, 
Marshall, Scalia, and Blackmun have now removed to the 
Highest Court of All. Only Justice Kennedy remains sitting on 
the Court, 28 years into his tenure. 
Finally, as to the parties themselves. In 1999, Rural 
Telephone Service Company re-branded itself as “Nex-Tech.”299 
Operating under that name, Rural continues to supply telephone 
service, along with Internet, TV, wireless, and security services, 
in northwest Kansas.300 
Feist Publications continued to publish area-wide 
directories, expanding into Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas.301 By 
2004, it was the fifth-largest independent publisher of telephone 
directories in the country, with a staff of 272 people, publishing 
20 directories with a total circulation of 4 million.302 In 2004, 
Feist Publications was acquired by Yellow Book USA, the oldest 
and largest independent publisher of telephone directories in the 
United States.303 Tom Feist, the founder, died in 2011.304 His 
family said that his Supreme Court victory in Feist was his 
“proudest achievement.”305 
  
                                                 
 299. NEX-TECH, https://www.nex-tech.com/about.Aspx [https://perma.cc/5ZXR-68VX]. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Yellow Book USA Acquires Feist Publications, supra note 127, at paras. 1, 6, 8. 
 302. Id. at para. 6. 
 303. Id. at paras. 1, 7. 
 304. Bill Wilson, Feist Publications Patriarch Dies at 77, THE WICHITA EAGLE (Jan. 
20, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.kansas.com/news/business/article1052756.html 
[https://perma.cc/2GVH-TLVP]. 
 305. Id. at para. 22. 
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APPENDIX 1:  
THE KANSAS CORPORATION  
COMMISSION’S DIRECTIVE 
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APPENDIX 2: 
THE DUELING  
TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES 
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APPENDIX 3:  
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